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ABSTRACT 
For 26 years, Sri Lankan Armed Forces applied counterinsurgency principles (COIN) 
while fighting against LTTE terrorists, but could not achieve the aim of defeating 
terrorism. During this period, the LTTE was able to establish itself as a real conventional 
army. It expanded its capabilities to include a naval wing (sea tiger wing), and an air 
wing. Its cadres were well motivated to conduct three-dimensional missions (land, air and 
sea) as well as suicide missions. It was not until the fourth phase, however—Eelam War 
IV of the Sri Lanka campaign—that the Sri Lankan government was able to establish 
peace within the country again in 2009. In this context, the researcher examines why 
success eluded Sri Lanka until the final phase of the campaign, since the same principles 
(COIN) were followed in all battles. Eelam War IV featured important changes to the Sri 
Lankan government’s COIN strategy.  Those changes were incorporated into the 
outcomes in order to develop analysis on this topic. Further, this study will offer a new 
approach to analyzing the Sri Lanka insurgency. As a further outcome, the paper may 
provide opportunity for scholarly assessment by decision makers to assess the possibility 
of modifying counterinsurgency principles based on the Sri Lankan experience. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The recent victory by the Sri Lankan military in a bloody separatist war ended 26 
long years of brutal fighting in Sri Lanka. The end result was the total destruction and 
defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorist organisation. This 
conflict has drawn the interest of many nations to find out what new strategies and plans 
contributed to the success of the fourth and final phase—Elam War IV—also named the 
“Humanitarian Operation.”  
After nearly three decades (1983 to 2009) of conflict, the Sri Lankan government, 
including the Armed Forces, followed the principles of COIN. There were four major 
phases of this war: Elam War I, Elam War II, Elam War III and Elam War IV. The battles 
against the LTTE were costly—approximately tens of thousands Sri Lankan lives were 
lost, many more injured and vast amounts of resources were destroyed or lost across the 
country. The first three battles failed to meet their objective, which was the end of 
terrorism in Sri Lanka. However, Elam War IV was able to eradicate terrorism. As a 
result, there were a number of lessons learned from the successes and failures in fighting 
domestic terrorism. 
In this context, this thesis will strive to answer the questions: What enabled Sri 
Lanka to succeed in Elam War IV? What were the critical differences from the three 
previous phases? What explains Sri Lanka’s success after two decades of failure? In 
answering these questions, this study attempts to address lessons learned from Sri Lanka 
and how those lessons might compel us to reassess existing counterinsurgency doctrines. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The prevalence of conflict and civil war around the world, especially in the 
current Western war on violent Islamist extremists, has garnered a great deal of attention 
from the international community. Non-state actors, guerrillas, and their factions have 
constantly confronted the writ of government. How states have managed to deal with 
guerrillas is a critical query within the system of international relations. Internal armed 
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conflict among states and non-state actors has become a leading fashion in warfare since 
World War II. Insurgent organizations within a country, keen to enact political change 
centred on deep-rooted grievances, often take up arms in an effort to modify the 
country’s ruling authorities, overthrow the existing government, or break free from their 
control.1 An understanding of these subtleties between the ruling party and the rebellion 
groups, which challenge the country’s integrity and sovereignty, may offer important 
lessons for policy makers and strategists in formulating counterinsurgency responses.  
As the global community searches for strategies or countermeasures to deal with 
this global problem, it is advisable to learn lessons from countries that have successfully 
dealt with insurgents.  
Sri Lanka is one of those countries that successfully eradicated a terrorist threat. 
Sri Lanka offers an important case study because its campaign was lengthy, including 
distinct phases of fighting against a formidable insurgent organisation, thus offering us 
longitudinal comparative lessons in both successes and failures. In addition, it offers 
valuable information about counterinsurgency campaigns operated by a resource-poor 
country, as opposed to the methods used in campaigns by superpowers against terrorist 
organisations.  
Existing counterinsurgency principles and strategies were formulated in 1951, 
based on the British Malayan campaign.2 Many nations, including superpowers and small 
countries like Sri Lanka, have adopted these principles and have achieved successes as 
well as failures. However, the strategies covering these counterinsurgency principles have 
gaps and lapses in the face of present-day conflicts.  
There may be other, less tangible factors to consider in Sri Lanka’s success. 
Although Sri Lanka was a developing country with minimal support from Western and 
regional powers, it survived and succeeded in its counterinsurgency campaign, and, 
among things, it may be that the political will of the populace was part of that success.  
                                                 
1 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3–24: Counter Insurgency (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army 
Headquarters, 2000), 12. 
2 Counter Insurgency Operations: AFM Vol (B) (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Defense Services Command 
and Staff Collage, Sri Lanka, 2005), i–ix. 
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Finally, this study will offer a new method for analysing Sri Lankan terrorism. No 
author or scholar has yet used COIN principles as a theoretical structure in which to 
gauge Sri Lanka’s political and military action against the LTTE’s “separate state 
struggle” against the government. As a further outcome, the paper may provide 
opportunity for scholarly assessment by decision makers to assess the possibility of 
modifying counterinsurgency principles based on the Sri Lankan experience. 
C. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES 
For 26 years, Sri Lankan Armed Forces applied counterinsurgency principles 
while fighting against LTTE terrorists, but could not achieve the aim of defeating 
terrorism. During this period, the LTTE was able to establish itself as a real conventional 
army. It expanded its capabilities to include a naval wing (sea tiger wing), and an air 
wing. Its cadres were well motivated to conduct three-dimensional missions (land, air and 
sea) as well as suicide missions. It was not until the fourth phase (Eelam War IV) of the 
Sri Lankan campaign, however, that the Sri Lankan government was able to establish 
peace within the country again. In this context, the researcher examines why success 
eluded Sri Lanka until the final phase of the campaign, since the same principles (COIN) 
were followed in all battles. 
Eelam War (Phase IV) featured important changes to the Sri Lankan 
government’s COIN strategy. These changes included transforming the population by 
making them part of the solution. This was accomplished through a grass roots movement 
that motivated, edified, and increased confidence within local communities. Also, 
military operations were scaled down to small teams, which facilitated greater flexibility 
in target acquisition, intelligence collection on the target by ground troops (HUMINT), 
and manoeuvrability of larger forces to advance and occupy the area with fewer 
casualties and less damage to equipment. In addition, infusion of technology and a 
coordinated internal and external intelligence network enabled the Sri Lankan 
government to restrict external support and then destroy much of the LTTE’s capabilities 
more easily than in previous battles. Moreover, a transparent media system and a 
transformed political and military hierarchy working together were able to garner greater 
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military professionalism, public support, and accomplish mission objectives by sharing 
information and motivating society to join the military—as well as to provide 
humanitarian needs to the affected Tamil population. Lastly, an independent government 
was able to gain support from allies other than traditional Western allies by strengthening 
diplomatic and economic relationships.  
I will explore to what extent these changes made a difference in the outcome by 
comparing their presence or absence in the first three phases of Sri Lankan’s COIN 
strategy. This thesis assumes that the critical differences between Phase IV and the three 
previous phases relates to COIN strategy, not to the behaviour of the LTTE insurgent 
group. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review provided in this section presents the basis for this 
dissertation regarding publications on the success of counterinsurgency strategies of Sri 
Lanka’s Phase IV operation against the LTTE. 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies are defined as measures that are taken by 
the government to combat the rebel groups. Such measures are comprised of political, 
psychological, economic, civic and military activities, which are formulated to suppress 
or conquer the insurgent groups.3 David Galula explains that counterinsurgency or 
(COIN) strategies are politically activated campaigns which exploit all the elements of 
the country in order to eradicate the insurgent group.4 Although, combating insurgent 
groups requires military resources to counteract, certain non-military resources should 
also be used to counterbalance. These non-military strategies include 
re-establishing the local authority, reforming economy, or development of infrastructure.5 
Although combating insurgent groups through military resources is more direct, certain 
non-military resources focus on the civilians so that the country’s legitimacy can be  
                                                 
3 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3–24: Counter Insurgency, 1–1. 
4 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (PSI Classics of the 
Counterinsurgency Era) (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2006), 62–63. 
5 Ibid., 63. 
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enhanced and the support for the insurgent groups can be reduced.6 The insurgent groups 
and the counterinsurgency strategies combat in order to win the hearts and minds of the 
civilians.7 
On any given level, an international outlook will prove that countries that are not 
hostile are also not in harmony.8 The purpose of this literature review is to discuss the 
reasons behind the appearance of insurgent movement in few countries of the world and 
understand the complexities behind these insurgencies. There are numerous definitions 
regarding counterinsurgency or (COIN) strategies that do not involve war.9 Furthermore, 
these definitions enable us to comprehend the need to expand the involvement of public 
communities—and involve professional, religious, and academic institutions—as players 
in a domestic conflict.10  
The above-mentioned literature excerpts are presented to discuss the background 
of the insurgency conflict: the beginning, the phases of domestic conflicts and its 
escalation.  It also discusses the correct measures that can be implemented to manage, 
control and avoid further conflict. This discussion will help provide the knowledge about 
counterbalancing measures and support a comparison of their strengths and weaknesses 
against all the types of domestic conflict, including terrorism.   
Stephan Biddle is a strategist who explains that counteracting measures present 
the methods in which radical changes in the administration and public structure can 
diminish terror levels.11 He further explains the ways in which states should formulate 
their strategies and consider various aspects such as strengths and weaknesses, 
                                                 
6 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3–24: Counter Insurgency, 1–1. 
7 Bard O’Neil, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse (Washington, D.C: 
Potomac Books Inc., 2nd ed., 2005), 169. 
8 Counter Insurgency Operations: AFM Vol (B) (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Defense Services Command 
and Staff Collage, 2005), iv–v. 
9 Counter Insurgency Operations (Silhert, Bangladesh: School of Infantry and Tactics, Special 
Warfare Wing, 1998), 1–4. 
10 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World  (New 
York: Copernicus Books, 2003), 12–99. Explains how those actors involvement in internal security as well 
as internal onflicts. 
11 Daniel L. Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (Hoboken, New 
Jersey: John Wily & Sons, 2008), 52–82. 
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implications, and so forth. The strategic and tactical measures utilized by the government 
to counteract are far and varied. They vary from hard-core measures like creating anti-
terrorism law and empowering the judiciary system, to less noticeable measures like the 
establishment of automated banks for data and boosting intelligence capacities and secret 
measures.12   
The counterinsurgency or (COIN) publications explain that for more than 100 
years, the British government was involved in insurgent operations of various kinds. 
Thus, with this vast knowledge of combating insurgent groups, it has evolved a doctrine 
of counterinsurgency strategies.13 The COIN publications explain that the current 
counterinsurgency guidelines, principles and strategies were actually based on three-
decades-old British experiences. It included political dominance, political objective, 
synchronized government and administration, intelligence services, separation of support 
for insurgent groups, counterbalancing the insurgent groups and long-run planning for 
post insurgency.14 The military and other armed services were pre-occupied with various 
manoeuvres other than war. They explained that the military and other armed services 
believed that there was little or no pressure to revise measures used to counterbalance 
because there was little indication of a requirement for change.15  
The text from the Sri Lanka’s Defense Services Command and Staff College 
states that certain measures or strategies, which were applied successfully in past, were 
not feasible for Sri Lanka’s situation.16 The past studies also indicate that there was a 
severe need for a publication that identifies new strategies and principles which could be 
applied in the future. 
                                                 
12 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, A Strategic Framework for Counter Terrorism and 
Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), 44. 
13 Counter Insurgency Operations: AFM Vol (B) (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Defense Services Command 
and Staff Collage, Sri Lanka, 2005), i. 
14 Ibid,. 1–2. 
15 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping (Harrisburg, PA: 
Stackpol Books, 1st ed., 1971), 208. 
16 Counter Insurgency Operations: AFM Vol (B) (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Defense Services Command 
and Staff Collage, Sri Lanka, 2005), 1–2. 
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John Nagal constructed a learning framework for military and armed forces in 
order to scrutinize the effectiveness of American and British counterinsurgency (COIN) 
measures.17 This model involved the application of the lessons learned and their adoption 
in active combat situations. The Malayan crisis started in June 1948 and was ended by the 
British military and armed forces in December 1951. This emergency provided the 
groundwork for current counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies.18 The outcomes of this 
emergency were analysed and the lessons, which were learned during the entire COIN 
strategy, were used for later operations.  
The text presents logical motives for the formulation of strategies, as well as 
motives for the revision or rejection of some strategies. However, certain publication 
regarding the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Kenya, Malaya, and Cyprus—and the 
counterbalancing operations of Rhodesia, Italy, Vietnam and Germany—exposed issues 
in past strategies used for counterbalancing insurgent groups. This literature shows that 
there is a severe need for the formulation of new strategies and their development and 
implementation. It is also necessary to consider the outcomes, experiences, and lessons 
which were learned from those operations for the comprehensive development and 
logical countrywide counterinsurgency scheme.19 Since 9/11, after so many years of war 
against terrorism and U.S. and NATO armed forces combating the Taliban, the U.S. and 
NATO armed forces still have not achieved complete control of Afghanistan.20 This on-
going 11-year battle proves that the techniques used in the past are no longer applicable 
in today’s world. In the case of the Afghan Taliban, the forces must use different 
measures and strategies to combat this domestic conflict because of the involvement of 
national as well as international forces. 
                                                 
17 Raymond A. Millen, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup 
with a Knife, The CBS Intreactive Business Network, 2004, accessed February 11, 2011, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_3_34/ai_n6214951/.  
18 John Coats, Suppressing Insurgency (San Francisco, CA: Oxford, Westview Press, 1992), 223. 
19 Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Framework for Counter Terrorism and Insurgency; REUTERS. Can 
America win in Afganistan? Reuters, May 25, 2010, accessed August 29, 2011, from 
http://blogs.reuters.com/afganistan/2010/05/25/can-america-win-in-af., 1–3. 
20 Center for a New American Security, Developing Strong, Pragmatic and Principled National 
Security and Defense Policies: Afganitan and Pakistan, 2008–2011, accessed August 29, 2011, from 
http://www.cnas.org/afganistan?gclid=C17tiOnm9aoCFWUZQgodDGbBlw, 1–2. 
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During the first three stages of Sri Lanka’s 26 years of internal conflict, 
“government and security forces, with the support and assistance of other nations, fought 
to eradicate terrorism” by implementing previously formulated counterinsurgency 
principles.21 In 2007, new strategies were developed (focusing on “diplomacy, tactical 
and operational manoeuvres, intelligence, use of technology, media and propaganda, 
political aim and will, [gaining] population support, humanitarian” aspects, and others).22 
By taking a closer look at the counterinsurgency principles that were based on past 
experience, and by addressing all four COIN stages (preparatory phase, active resistance 
phase, insurgency phase, and open offensive phase) of internal conflict simultaneously,23 
the LTTE was defeated.  
Some “governments have paid attention to [gaining] popular support through 
winning the hearts and minds of the people.”24 However, while this tactic contributed to 
the success of the fourth phase of the Sri Lankan campaign, it was overlooked in the 
literature as one of the principles of improved counterinsurgency techniques employed by 
Sri Lanka.25 
Current counterinsurgency principles indicate that force ratios for any battle 
against insurgents should be six or more to one.26 Today, we are learning that application 
of such a force ratio may create increased target opportunities for insurgents or may lead 
to violation of the Geneva Convention because insurgents tend to fight using civilians as 
                                                 
21 L. H. M. Mendis, Assignment Peace in the Name of the Motherland: Eelam War I, IPKF 
Operations, Eelam War II, Eelam War III, and the Undeclared Eelam War IV (Colombo, Western, 2009), 
66. 
22 Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Framework for Counter Terrorism and Insurgency: Can America 
win in Afganistan? Reuters, May 25, 2010, accessed August 30, 2011, from 
http://blogs.reuters.com/afganistan/2010/05/25/can-america-win-in-af. 
23 Counter Insurgency Operations, AFM Vol (B) (Silhert, Bangladesh: School of Infantry and Tactics, 
Special Warfare Wing, Bangladesh, 1998), 4–6. 
24 Sam C. Sarkesian and John Allen Williams, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: 
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993), 334. 
25 Media Center Sri Lanka, Media Center for National Development for Sri Lanka, August 18, 2010. 
Accessed March 05, 2011. http://www.development.lk/news.php?news=786, 1A. 
26 Counter Insurgency Operations: AFM Vol (B) (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Defense Services Command 
and Staff Collage, Sri Lanka, 2005), 89. 
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shields for their protection.27 Improved technology provides an even further increase in 
force ratio, which includes both men and materials, and this technology employment has 
created even more targets for insurgents. Although much has been written about the 
failures and victories of battles, nowhere is the excessive use of manpower discussed.28 
Further, this excessive manpower is never discussed as contributing to heavy casualty 
figures.  
The literature reviewed argues how lessons learned effectively and progressively 
have been (and are) applied during subsequent wars. Most of the literature saw that after 
identifying COIN principles, no further studies have been conducted to shape the policies 
to make them relevant to present-day contemporary conflicts. The reshaping of any 
principle should be universal, allowing its application to be relevant to the scenario of 
any internal conflict. At present, existing strategies and countermeasures are either not 
contemporary, or are very old, or are systematically changed from combat to combat—
but they are not firm. 29 Hence it is required to study and identify whether they are 
appropriate to present-day internal conflict or whether they need to be refined. 
Researchers have attempted to find answers for the questions that arose as gaps in 
literature by researching what role the then-prevailing counterinsurgency principles 
played in the Sri Lankan defeat of the LTTE. Such findings, with applicable alterations 
and modifications, could be recommended for the future application of counterinsurgency 
principles, to be used before any internal conflict gets to an insurgency stage. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
A combination of the study of literature and other available information, as well 
as personal Sri Lankan Armed Forces experience, will be used to test this hypothesis. The 
information garnered from these resources will be applied to each battle in the Sir Lankan 
                                                 
27 V. K. Shashikumar, “Russia’s Atomic Proposal on Table: Iran,” IBN Live, April 26, 2009, accessed 
December 05, 2011, from http://ibnlive.in.com/news/cornered-lte-useing-civilians-as-human-shield/9116–
2.html. , 2. 
28 Mari-Jana “M-J” Oboroceanu, Anne Leland, Congressional Research Service, Defense Manpower 
Dta Center, February 26, 2010, accessed March 05, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/netsec/RL32492.pdf. 
,1–2. 
29 Ibid.; Byman, The Five Front War, 81–82. 
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campaign in relation to counterinsurgency principles, for the purpose of identifying 
whether the strategies applied in Eelam War IV had covered all the principles or whether 
anything was missed, needed to be refined or revised, or be identified as an additional 
principle adopted for the success of Eelam War IV. The research will be conducted based 
on content obtained from secondary sources, including historical analysis and 
informational articles found in libraries, training establishments, and the Internet. Since 
no research studies or books have been published on the post-2009 Sri Lankan conflict, I 
will review operation-completion reports in order to find claims and lessons learned from 
the operation. The study will also utilize the author’s own experience as a member of the 
Sri Lankan Armed Forces.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This study focuses on completely relevant issue of the rise of insurgent groups, 
which the world has witnessed after the World War II. These asymmetric wars are 
generally quite expensive, prolonged, complicated and typically involve domestic or 
international powers which have significant interest in the resolution of the conflict. 
These wars are strikingly violent and most times, quite outraging—they leave many 
civilians dead or missing, and cause economic instability and the lack of government 
control. 
Nowadays, these rebel insurgencies are found in numerous countries across the 
continents. India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are some of the most well-known examples. 
Thus, there is no doubt that these rebel insurgencies are and will carry on posing 
significant challenges to domestic and international policies for many countries. 
For counterinsurgents, the strategy of seizing the enemy intellectually and 
understanding how to beat them and succeed in the implementation of the strategies that 
are necessary is quite chaotic and time consuming. T.E. Lawrence explains this process 
as “eating soup with a knife.”30 Although, the process of examining the past 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies to analyse the major elements, which helped in 
                                                 
30 John A. Nagal, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife:Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam, accessed August 31, 2011, from http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/567702.html.  
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explaining the failure or victory of the counterinsurgency (COIN) principles, is vital, it is 
also crucial to extract the key lessons learned during the past domestic conflicts to devise 
more effective future strategies for counterinsurgency (COIN). This could be explained 
as the “spoon for eating soup.”  
As such, it is fundamental to study past COIN battles in order to decide what 
features best elucidate the success or failure of an irregular force. Obtaining lessons 
learned from past combats may help future counterinsurgents techniques better, more 
efficient strategies. 
While this study on Sri Lanka will not give out exact proposals on how to conduct 
a COIN battle, it will be an addition to the COIN literature that policy makers to conduct 
further studies in order to improve COIN strategies.  
Chapter I is the introductory chapter and will primarily consist of this research 
proposal document along with defining some other pertinent concepts in regards to COIN 
methodology and theory. Chapter II deals with the historical background of the conflict, 
in particular the causative factors for the Eelam Wars, as well as an overview of the four 
main phases of this struggle. The Sri Lankan government’s application of COIN 
strategies in relation to their national objectives during each battle will be discussed in 
Chapter III. Chapter IV will include findings and discussion related to the study. Chapter 
V will present a comprehensive conclusion along with a series of recommendations for 
future COIN campaigns that may assist other government agencies by providing them 
with the summarized findings and lessons learned in this thesis. 
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE SRI LANKAN CONFLICT 
A. ORIGIN OF THE CONFLICT 
The background to the LTTE insurgency depicts a historical trend in the Sri 
Lankan government’s dealings with the Tamil minority population since the British left. 
This trend began with an assertion of Sinhalese political power and concurrent 
marginalization of Tamil groups. This marginalization continued and worsened, ending 
with devastating ethnic conflict facilitated in part by the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan 
government. The effect of this trend was a Tamil Diaspora that escaped the country under 
extremely violent conditions. This Diaspora not only blamed Colombo for the violence, 
but came to accept the LTTE as the protectors of Tamil interests in Sri Lanka.31 In the 
early twentieth century, the Sinhalese community started a nationalist movement 
demanding an independent nation. The British granted them independence in 1948 after 
peaceful negotiations. Immediately after the independence, while drafting the first 
constitution, the disagreements between Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic communities began 
to surface. After Ceylon was granted independence from Britain, many Tamils and 
academics argued that the Sinhalese majority quickly asserted itself on the island and 
began to re-shape the political environment in its favour. There were several reasons for 
this political assertion. Some authors point to the Sinhalese as suffering from a “Double 
Minority Complex,” meaning that the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka actually considers 
itself a minority. This is because it perceives that the 60+ million Tamils living in the 
state of Tamil Nadu-India are part of the calculation. Others claim that the British rulers 
purposefully disempowered the Buddhist Sangha, or religious order, within the Sinhalese 
community in order to gain political advantage and to facilitate the establishment of 
favoured Christian institutions. After independence, the Sangha then quickly began to 
mobilize the majority Sinhalese population, making up for lost time and correcting what 
they had believed to be the Western and/or Tamil-influenced social ills that had 
                                                 
31 Lionel Beehner, “What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN,” Small Wars Journal (August 27, 
2010), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-sri-lanka-can-teach-us-about-coin (accessed August 14, 
2011). 
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permeated under British rule.32 Others also assert that the political structures of Sri 
Lanka, especially the structures that were created directly after independence, allowed for 
the Sangha to mobilize the masses so easily. These academics point to several works and 
political documents to support this point: the Buddhist Committee of Inquiry’s The 
Betrayal of Buddhism, and its effects on the elections of 1956; The Sinhala Only Act, 
which banned the Tamil language from official use; and the constitutional reforms of 
1972, which recognized Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka and declared 
Buddhism as having a primary place over other religions. Each of these is an example of 
Sinhalese political mobilization, and the concurrent disenfranchisement of the Tamil 
populations during the first few decades of Sri Lankan statehood. In these early days of 
Sinhalese political mobilization, Tamils’ counter-actions involved political rallies and 
peaceful protests aimed at political re-integration within the Sri Lankan state. These non-
violent measures were answered by Sinhalese rioting against the Sri Lankan Tamil 
populations, and additional political actions that heightened tensions.33 
The riots of 1956 and 1958 are mentioned above; however, several others 
occurred in 1961, 1974, 1977, 1979, and in 1981. Furthermore, a large body of evidence 
suggests that over time, Sri Lankan government forces allowed these riots to take place. 
For example, riots in 1977 occurred after the Tamil United Liberation Front had won an 
overwhelming majority of Tamil votes based on a campaign pledge to achieve a separate 
state of Tamil Eelam within the federal structure. The TULF further articulated this 
stance by publishing what is known as the “Vaddukoddai Resolution.” Despite their 
stated intention to create a separate Tamil state, the TULF at the time was still willing to 
achieve its desired ends peacefully and institutionally. The ensuing violence, perpetrated 
in part by Sri Lankan police, was officially blamed on the victims by the presidentially 
 
 
                                                 
32 Peter Chalk, “Commentary no. 77: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International 
Organization and Operations; A Preliminary Analysis,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service, March 17, 
2000, 7. 
33De Silva Ranasinghe, “Defeat of the LTTE and its Significance,” Asia Defense News 5 (May–June 
2009), 12–13. 
 15
appointed investigator. This claim by the investigator validated and condoned the 
ethnically charged violence exacted upon the Tamil victims by Sinhalese mobs that were 
being led in part by Sri Lankan police. 
In 1979, the Sinhalese majority in Parliament, under the leadership of President 
Jayawardene, passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act in response to the fledgling (and 
not universally accepted) Tamil separatist movement that was slowly emerging in the 
Tamil-dominated North. The Act allowed the police and military broad powers of arrest 
and detainment without trial or evidence. Reports indicate that indiscriminate 
incarceration and torture ensued. The Act was intended to coerce this fledgling insurgent 
movement into demobilization yet, in reality, had the opposite effect. Furthermore, this 
Act allowed for police to conduct extra-judicial killings in response to attacks against 
police officers. These killings facilitated the next series of ethnic riots in 1981. Although 
the riots were caused by several factors, one stands out in particular. While responding to 
crowd violence during election campaign rallies in Tamil dominated areas, several 
Sinhalese police officers were killed. In retribution, police and Sinhalese groups 
throughout Sri Lanka went on a rampage, not only killing innocent Tamils and burning 
homes, but allegedly attempting to destroy Tamil heritage sites by burning the public 
library in Jaffna, which included original, and thereby irreplaceable, Tamil manuscripts. 
In a surprising note of candour, the Sri Lankan president fully admitted that members of 
his own party had instigated some of the violence committed against Tamils during these 
riots. 
The history of the political relationship between the two communities in the post-
colonial phase shows a growing trend where Sinhalese political mobilization and ethnic 
empowerment at the ballot box led to a concurrent disenfranchisement of the Tamil 
population in Sri Lanka. Further, attempts over time to resolve many Tamils as futile saw 
the divisiveness by existing Tamil political groups. Tamil civil disobedience, peaceful in 
its intentions yet deadly in its outcome, was the result. The violent response by the state 
to the exercising of Tamil rights within Sri Lankan democracy further alienated many 
ethnic Tamils. This created a small but tight-knit youth movement that became convinced 
of militancy, and separation from the state, as the only way to protect Tamils. Above all, 
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clearly, the Sri Lankan government agents had, over time, become more involved in the 
riots. This solidified the perception among more and more Tamils that the Sri Lankan 
state was not only disingenuous, but also overtly violent toward Tamils. The largest and 
most damaging riot came in 1983, which signalled not only the apex of anti-Tamil ethnic 
violence to date, but radicalized many Tamils against the Sri Lankan state. Furthermore, 
the international Tamil Diaspora, which grew because of the increasing violence and 
disenfranchisement, became a main player in supporting the insurgency. 
The riots of 1983, described by one scholar as an “Orgy of Violence,” were 
implemented and organized by Sri Lankan state authorities. This is similar to previous 
rioting to date, yet far greater in scale. Most accounts describe the riots as a Sinhalese 
reaction to the death of 13 Sri Lankan soldiers, who were killed in an ambush in northern 
Sri Lanka by the fledgling Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). From July 24 to 
August 5, Sinhalese mobs attacked and destroyed Tamil businesses, killed Tamils and 
burned homes. The reported death toll varies widely dependent upon the source, with 
numbers anywhere from 350–2000 killed. Despite their origin in Colombo, the riots 
eventually spread as far as Trincomolee. Sinhalese mobs reportedly had voter registration 
lists with complete addresses of Tamils’ residences, businesses and numbers of family 
members. Allegedly, members of the government provided these lists to the organized 
mobs. Another important detail of these riots was the active participation of the Sri 
Lankan armed forces and military. There are numerous reports that members of the Sri 
Lankan Armed Forces and police not only directed the riots but actively participated in 
them. The after effects of the riots were also devastating.34 The number of refugees was 
estimated at 80,000–100,000 in the Colombo area alone. The formation of camps to 
house the refugees created long-term suffering, as these Tamils had nowhere to turn 
because their entire livelihoods had been destroyed. 
As a direct result of these atrocities committed against Tamils throughout Sri 
Lanka, a large number fled the island, and established themselves in India, Australia, 
                                                 
34 Christine Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil 
Eelam Movements,”Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 11 (2005), 125–156. 
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Canada, the United States, the UK, and many other Western European countries.35 In 
fact, according to some estimates, approximately one-quarter of all Sri Lankan Tamils 
presently live in abroad. This equates to approximately 600,000 to 800,000 Sri Lankan 
Tamils spread throughout over 40 different countries, with the largest concentrations in 
Canada and the UK. In Toronto alone, the Tamil population is larger than the Tamil 
population in any city within Sri Lanka. Although the history of ethnic rioting in post-
independence Sri Lanka began as a series of legislative measures that the Tamil 
community perceived to be antithetical to Tamil interests, Sinhalese and Sri Lankan 
government reactions to Tamil grievances eventually sparked widespread violence that 
physically and emotionally destroyed Tamil communities. Arguably, the Diaspora has 
never forgotten this tragedy.36 Since 1983, Tamil Diaspora living in Western countries 
has become a political and economic force. Estimates indicate that, in recent years, the 
Diaspora raised and supplied 200–300 million USD annually to the Tamil insurgency. As 
of 2000, these funds provided the LTTE with over 80 percent of its annual budget. 
During the insurgency, the Diaspora funds allowed the LTTE to acquire high-tech 
weaponry and were allegedly used to curry political favour from Western politicians.37 
Several important inferences can be made in reference to the background of the 
Sri Lankan conflict. First, the Diasporas’ last real memory was the widespread violence 
exacted upon them by the Sinhalese, and a Sri Lankan government that was, at best, 
incapable of stopping the violence or, at worst, contributing in the activity. Second, Tamil 
political organizations did not initially envision the idea of a separate state. Instead, they 
desired greater inclusion and enfranchisement in the early days of Sri Lanka. However, as 
a product of the aforementioned actions, the voices calling for the formation of Tamil 
Eelam espoused in the body of the militant Tamil youth organizations became louder 
than the ones calling for peaceful reconciliation. Of course, the activities of the Sri 
Lankan government perpetuated this shift. Yet, that does not mean that moderate voices 
                                                 
35 Neil De Votta, Blowback Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri 
Lanka (Stanford University Press, 2004), 60–89. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Edgarm O’Balance, The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka (United Kingdom: 
Brasse’ys, 1990), 22. 
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were not available, they simply were drowned out by the sounds of Sinhalese mobs and 
the cries for war and revenge by Tamil youth. Interestingly enough, the perception of the 
conditions surrounding the plight of so many within the Diaspora allowed for the LTTE 
to continually rely upon Diaspora support, not only monetarily, but for political 
assistance as well. At the time of the 1983 riots, the LTTE had suddenly become the 
“avenging saviours” of disaffected Tamils. 
Immediately following the 1983 riots, the LTTE had no problem finding recruits, 
as many Tamils who did not flee with the Diaspora volunteered after witnessing the 
atrocities committed against them. With notable exceptions, a combination of LTTE 
“salesmanship,” coupled with the geographic separation of the Diaspora from everyday 
events in northern Sri Lanka, has allowed this perception largely to remain within the 
Diaspora, facilitating the continual flow of funding and political support. This Diaspora 
left behind family members and a homeland embroiled in civil war, fought between the 
Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government and many small Tamil insurgent groups. 
Arguably the most famous of which, and eventually the largest, was the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
After the IPKF pull out in 1990, the LTTE developed into a fearsome insurgency. 
Using the funding provided by the Diaspora, they rose in number and notoriety. They 
controlled large areas in northern Sri Lanka Subsequent operations by the Sri Lankan 
military during the 1990s and early 2000s were typically met with disaster as the LTTE 
continually outmanoeuvred them on land, sea, and air. Mullaitivu provides an example of 
such clashes in which the LTTE showed an upper hand. In the Battle of Unceasing 
Waves, the LTTE force of approximately 3000–4000 overran a Sri Lankan Army Brigade 
camp, which was supported by 122 mm artillery and 120 mm mortars. The result was at 
least 1520 Sri Lankan military dead; with the artillery and heavy mortars captured.” The 
LTTE is also credited with the development and implementation of the individually 
carried suicide vest, which they used to target not only political opponents such as Rajiv 
Gandhi and Sri Lankan Presidents Premadasa and Kumaratunga, but also other Tamil 
resistance groups. The technology and explosives required to develop such intricate 
operations and deadly devices derive from the Diaspora’s funding structures.  
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Yet despite their successes and wealth, the LTTE eventually came to an end. In 
May of 2009, after a two-and-a-half year military offensive, the Sri Lankan Armed 
Forces surrounded the last of the insurgents as they attempted a desperate last stand, 
ironically enough, on the beaches in Mullaitivu. The LTTE was once a unit of over 
10,000 battle-hardened guerrillas. However, the remnants that attempted this act of 
desperation consisted of many conscripted young children, who held civilians as human 
shields. Meanwhile, their core leadership made desperate calls from their makeshift 
bunkers for American or British protection upon surrender. Arguably, they were only a 
shell of what was once considered to be one of the most feared insurgent movements of 
the modem age. This last stand resulted in the death and capture of the last of the 
holdouts. As proof of the insurgency’s demise, a photo of LTTE leader Vellupillai 
Prabhakaran was released, with a bullet hole in his forehead. Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the 
head of the LTTE’s international diplomatic relations committee, released the following 
statement: “we have already announced to the world our position to silence our guns to 
save our people.”38 With that statement, the Tamil Tigers admitted to a military defeat 
and the longest-running war in South Asia came to an end. 
B. BATTLES OF EELAM WAR 
1. Eelam War I 
The Eelam war I initiated in October 1981, when one armed officer was killed in 
Jaffna. Over time, the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) continued creating 
havoc under the authority of Veupillai Prabhakaran during the elections on 1983. They 
used package bombs for panicking civilians.39 Many people were displaced in the riots 
caused by this havoc, which resulted in thousands of Muslims and Sinhalese being forced 
to leave their houses. These riots led to an even bigger outrage on July 23, 1983, which 
resulted in killing 13 armed Sri Lankan officers by the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam 
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(LTTE).40 An even larger riot exploded throughout the state, particularly in the eastern 
and northern parts of Sri Lanka. These riots had severe consequences at an international 
level. Huge numbers of Sri Lankan Tamils fled the country and sought refuge in other 
countries. These civilians who fled the country later supported a new Sri Lankan state for 
Tamils. 
On the other hand, the Tamil insurgents expanded their rebellious actions, to 
which the government responded by doubling the counterbalancing strategy. Around 200 
military campsites were set up in the East, North and Wanni area in order to achieve the 
objective. In the meantime, the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) also started the 
tactic of kidnapping government and administrative officers, alongside other rebellious 
activities like mass murdering the border villagers of Sinhalese. The Tamil Tigers then 
opted toward guerrilla warfare tactics and attempted to attack the Batticalo jail to protect 
their leaders. The neighbouring friendly nations helped them by providing military gear 
and gadgets and funding and providing combative training. In the meantime, the 
Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) carried on their violent tactics to achieve 
militant dominance in the area over other rebel groups such as the Tamil National 
Alliance (TNA), Peoples Liberation of Tamil Eelam (PLOT), and Tamil Eelam 
Liberation Organisation (TELO), etc. The heads of other militant groups, such as 
Sabarathnam, were murdered, and a majority of the members of Sabarathnam left Sri 
Lanka to find refuge in India.  
The government’s expenditure on defense inclined. In order to reclaim control of 
the Vadamarachchi region in the peninsula of Jaffna, the government initiated the 
“Operation Liberation” which was targeted towards forcing the Tamil Tigers to start re-
negotiating over the peace talks that initially took place in Bhutan but did not achieve the 
desired results and disintegrated before the Operation Liberation. In the early hours of 
May 26, 1987, history was made when Sri Lanka launched two brigades in an offensive 
manoeuvre, which was commanded by the late Maj Gen Vijaya Wimalarathne and Lt 
General Denzil Kobbekaduwa. The taskforces were successful to finish the assigned 
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mission in five days. This operation helped the military forces to reclaim the control of 
Vadamarachchi area. This incident proved to be a brutal setback for the Tamil Tigers. 
The situation for Tamil Tigers became even worse when the military forces reclaimed 
control of Velvetithurai area that was the hometown of much admired LTTE leader V. 
Prabakaran. Vadamarachchi was also hometown for other respected and senior leaders of 
LTTE. The intervention of India in this conflict put extra pressure on the Sri Lankan 
government; therefore, the Sri Lankan government had to terminate the operation against 
the Tamil militants. Thousands of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) landed in Sri 
Lanka to help with the conflict as per the peace accord of 1987, which was between India 
and Sri Lanka.  
2. Eelam War II 
The attempt of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to neutralize the Tamil 
Tiger failed. As soon as the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) left the country, the 
Tamil Tigers got hold of the northern and eastern areas of the country. Government again 
made sufficient efforts to hold peace talks with the LTTE, which did not result as 
anticipated. The small operations later became fully blown war. The LTTE often 
viciously targeted and murdered the police. The Tamil Tigers murdered approximately 
600 police officers and the task forces in the northern areas were targeted and 
kidnapped.41 Another mission, “Operation Eagle” was carried out by the Air Force of Sri 
Lanka, as a rescue mission to release the kidnapped officers in Jaffna Fort. The ever-
inclining pressure in the combat zone, the government needed to launch a full-scale 
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign to defeat the Tamil Tigers. Only a few military 
bases of Sri Lankan Military forces were forced to pull out since they lacked sufficient 
number of troops. These bases were Kokavil, Mankulam, ThalaiMannar and 
Kondachchie. Due to lack of sufficient routes by land, the Sri Lankan Army heavily 
relied on the Air Force for the fortifications and battle equipment. The Palaly airstrip was 
directly under the striking range of Tamil Tigers. However, the brave and resolute Sri 
Lankan Air Force pilots brought fortifications and battle equipment despite being under 
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the heavy fire from the Tamil Tigers. The expansion of the Palaly campsite was carried 
out under Operation Jayashakti. The main purpose of this expansion was to provide the 
smooth landing of Air Force planes outside of the striking range of the Tamil Tigers.42  
The Tamil Tigers further thrived with the help of international funding and 
endorsements—which sustained their kidnapping and murdering of innocent people. 
Kathankudi, Paliyagodella and Eravour massacres are horrifying examples of Tamil 
Tiger’s brutality. The Tamil Diaspora made Europeans believe that the Tamil Tigers are 
just in their actions. 43 Meanwhile, the Tamil Tigers expanded their weapons and battle 
equipment to commence major militant operations to achieve their objectives. They also 
commenced marine attacks on military and armed froes base camps alongside the land 
troops. Together the sea and land troops attacked and seized the Mulaithive base and 
captured all the weapons and equipment and murdered the soldiers who were at the 
brigade. The Mulaithive base massacre was the largest military massacre conducted by 
the Tamil Tigers.  
3. Eelam War III 
By the year 1994, the negotiations with the Tamil Tigers started once again when 
the recently-elected administration took office. However, like previous attempts, it failed 
again due to unfair demands of the Tamil Tigers. These unreasonable and unfair demands 
led to the termination of numerous operations which were being conducted against the 
LTTE. The Military Forces of Sri Lanka re-captured Jaffna from LTTE after the peace 
talks were failed. After a long period of 12 years, on December 2, 1995, the town of 
Jaffna was declared under control of the military forces. The city of Jaffna was conquered 
with minimal property damage. However, the Tamil Tigers managed to strip away all the 
functioning objects and equipment from the Teaching Hospital of Jaffna.  
The North region of Jaffna was not connected the South region of Jaffna due to 
lack of manpower in the Sri Lankan military. The Tamil Tigers developed their 
capabilities by launching suicide attacks under water. Through this, the LTTE targeted 
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and destroyed numerous navy boats of Sri Lanka. The LTTE also developed their 
capabilities in air missile launches. This helped them shoot down many aircraft and 
helicopters of Sri Lankan Air Force. By taking numerous measures, the LTTE was again 
able to recapture certain regions, which were previously reclaimed by the Sri Lankan 
government under the Jayasekuru operation. These regions included the Elephant pass 
and Kilinochchi. The LTTE also attacked Bandaranayke Airport, Katunayake Air Force 
base and other major economic hubs of Sri Lanka in this period.  
In February 2002, the newly elected government again attempted negotiations; 
however, this time the LTTE responded, which gave the LTTE enormous political 
recognition. Meanwhile, they were gaining immense momentum and achieved huge 
military power on land, air, and sea. During the peace negotiations process, the Tamil 
Tigers collected enormous amounts of taxation money from the innocent people who had 
to visit Jaffna for business and other reasons.  
During this rather dormant period, the Tamil Tigers continued the most horrifying 
act in their militant history. In the year 2004, thanks to the unfair attitudes and treatment 
of Prabhakaran on the eastern cadres, the eastern commander of Tamil Tigers, Colonel 
Karuna, divided the LTTE with approximately 6000 carders and supporters. The 
following conflict between the LTTE and Colonel Karuna’s LTTE resulted in losing huge 
numbers of cadres and leaders. Meanwhile, the same year, the tsunami also affected the 
LTTE in a major way, which resulted in a major blow to the sea tiger wing and the 
overall LTTE. 
4. Eelam War IV 
All of the peace talks encountered failure due to the dishonest attitude of the 
LTTE. This was primarily because, throughout the war, Prabahkaran did not have any 
belief in the peace process and because he was so determined to succeed in obtaining 
Eelam through military means. The LTTE was always supportive and positive in 
negotiations until they uplifted their capabilities and were able to get reorganized to face 
the offensives of the security forces. In early 2006, peace negotiations were shadowed by 
bloody battles. The navy was continuously targeted by the LTTE.  
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In the year 2006, the Tamil Tigers of the eastern region started behaving like a 
real military instead of just a militant group. The Tamil Tigers regularly arrested, tortured 
and murdered many Tamil residents with the suspicion that they were undercover agents 
for the Karuna division of the LTTE. Furthermore, the Tamil Tigers shut down the 
Mavilaru sluice gate, which is in the Trincomalee region, in July of 2006. Due to this 
more than 30,000 civilians in the east region were left without the supply of water. This 
caused severe deprivation of fresh drinking water for the Tamils, the Muslims, and the 
Sinhalese—and also the rice fields, which require a huge supply of water.  
The Humanitarian Operation, which was also called the Eelam War IV, was 
aimed at reclaiming the Mavilaru sluice gate and opening the supply of drinking water for 
the residents. However, this operation was delayed, and was launched in a number of 
phases. It was aimed to counteract the major attack at the Muhamalai by the Tamil Tigers 
in August of 2006. At that time, Muhamalai was the country’s national front in the 
northern region.  
After a few ferocious counterinsurgency (COIN) measures, which integrated 
aspects of RMAs (Revolutions In Military Affairs),44 the military forces of Sri Lanka 
were successful in reclaiming Thoppigala, which was the largest active campsite of the 
Tamil Tigers in the eastern region. The counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, which was 
carried out in the eastern region, incorporated various methods of wars such as: combined 
land, sea, and air operations; SIOT (Special Infantry Operation Team) units; special task 
forces; and marine guerrilla warfare; along with other methods. These units and task 
forces infiltrated deep inside the control lines of the Tamil Tigers. 
The second stage of the fourth Eelam War was carried out for 18 months in the 
northern region of the country. It mostly focused on the Jaffna region in order to reclaim 
the Poonarien Isthmus—also called the Elephant Pass and Kilinochchi—which was 
considered the capital of Tamil Tigers. The capturing of these regions proved to be 
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strategically significant for the military operations and resulted in the demise of 
Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) in January of 2009.  
During this stage of the fourth Eelam War, the Armed and Military forces of Sri 
Lanka deployed a combined RMA strategy, which included RMA I, RMA III and RMA 
IV. The war inclined more towards the guerrilla methods of warfare in order to 
counterbalance the combined RMA strategies of Tamil Tigers. The decision of 
Vellupillai Prabhakaran to hold strategically significant territories proved to be the reason 
for the demise of Tamil Tigers. Vellupillai Prabhakaran underestimated the strength of 
Sri Lanka’s armed forces fully capable of RMA RMA III, RMA IV strategies, and I and 
opted to capture strategically significant regions. David Galula, a theorist of 
counterinsurgency (COIN) techniques explains that lack of logistically feasible 
capabilities ruled out consistent defensive strategies. Brilliant counteracting techniques 
will always defeat flawed strategies. Vellupillai Prabhakaran failed to anticipate the 
strength of the superior opponent forces. He did not formulate a defense strategy and 
support strategy, which the militant or rebel forces require during the insurgency 
movements. This illustrates that his strategies were flawed and failed to foresee the need 
for a revised strategy.    
After the operation, the few remaining Tamil Tigers were forced to retreat into the 
forests near Mullaittivu, a coastal settlement. These approximately 15000 fighters took 
along with them more than 300,000 Tamil residents, who were trapped with them. 
In a final blow to the Tamil Tigers, the Sri Lankan Air force landed on the town 
of Mullaithivu and captured around 3,000 devoted fighters along with the Tamil residents 
who were merely used as human guards within a 1,000 square kilometre area. Vellupillai 
Prabhakaran was becoming more and more desperate as the Sri Lankan military and 
armed forces were closing in on him. He knew that the Tamil Diaspora of Sri Lanka is 
the last hope that could rescue him by pressurising the worldwide community to interfere 
in favour of the Tamil Tigers. The international community did just that, however, the Sri 
Lankan government did not give up to the international pressure of completely and 
rapidly shutting down the operations against the Tamil Tigers. The government of Sri 
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Lanka utilized dynamic diplomatic techniques and diversion techniques like the Tamil 
Nadu general elections and outcomes of general election in India to be broadcasted.   
The foreign ministers of Great Britain and France also landed in Sri Lanka to 
officially plead to the Sri Lankan government to terminate the counterinsurgency 
operations and help release the residents who were trapped with the Tamil Tigers. A few 
days later, Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed and war against insurgency was almost 
over. 45   
A few devoted Tamil Tigers were still on the loose, but it was evident that the 
control lines of the Tamil Tigers were shrinking as they were losing men and support. 
During the year 2008, in a desperate attempt, the Tamil Tigers started attacking soft 
targets like the buses or trains etc., which resulted in murdering hundreds of civilians.46 
In the year 2008 alone, around 250,000 Tamil civilians were evacuated and when the war 
ended, the number of evacuated civilians was 450,000. 
Most of these evacuated civilians moved to the government campsites that were 
overloaded. Due to lack of hygiene, proper sanitation, food and medical equipment most 
of the people badly suffered. Furthermore, the Internally Displaced Personnel (IDPs) 
were facing severe challenges because of security concerns. Nonetheless, the Sri Lankan 
government provided the best of its capabilities to organise and conduct the rebuilding 
and resettling of the communities, whereas the COIN campaign was still in progress.  
In conclusion, the Tamil Tigers in the previous campaigns always successfully 
repelled the humanitarian measures conducted by the Sri Lankan government. Major 
attacks on the military and navy base camps were repelled very effectively and 
successfully. The counterbalancing measures were launched to re-open the gates of 
Mavilaru sluice and continued until the leadership and troops of Tamil Tigers were 
completely eradicated. During these successful operations the Tamil Tigers were defeated 
because they did not anticipate the strength of the superior opponent and did not revise 
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their strategies. They also did not anticipate the new tactics and strategies, which were 
adopted by the military and armed forces of Sri Lanka. After eradicating the leadership 
and troops of Tamil Tigers, the humanitarian operation was terminated by the Sri Lankan 
government on nineteenth of May in 2009. After almost 26 years, the Sri Lankan 
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III. APPLICATION OF STRATEGIES IN RELATION TO COIN 
PRINCIPLES IN THE EELAM WAR 
The insurgency war lasted for almost 25 years in Sri Lanka. After all these years 
of targeted attacks, suicide terror campaign, bombings, murder attempts of civilians and 
high profile government officials and famous people, the military and armed forces of Sri 
Lanka were finally successful to eradicate the insurgent Tamil Tigers from the country in 
the year 2009.47 Ever since Sri Lanka succeed in defeating the Tamil Tigers using revised 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies, the experts are inquiring to identify the method 
which Sri Lankan government adapted to successfully eradicate the domestic conflict. 
The success of counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy adopted by Sri Lanka is a result of 
mixed strategies such as government legitimacy, government’s external support, unity of 
effort, capability of reducing external support to the militant groups, intelligence, and 
brave and capable military forces. These asymmetric wars are generally quite expensive, 
prolonged, complicated and typically involve domestic or international powers which 
have significant interest in the resolution of the conflict. These wars are strikingly violent 
and most of the times, quite outraging. Most of the times these wars leave many civilians 
dead or missing, economic instability, and lack of government control. Nowadays, these 
rebel insurgencies are found in numerous countries across continents. India, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan are some of the most well known examples. Thus, there is no doubt that 
these rebel insurgencies are and will carry on posing significant challenges to domestic 
and international policies for many countries. 
The four prolonged wars of Eelam, which were fought between the Sri Lankan 
government and the Tamil Tigers, give enough evidence that in situations like these the 
government should deploy the best counterinsurgency (COIN) measures to defeat the 
insurgent rebels. The first three wars of Eelam, which initiated in 1981 and lasted until 
2004, were not successful because the Sri Lankan government failed to bring down the 
rising insurgency of the Tamil Tigers. All the previous three wars ended with peace talks 
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between the government and the insurgent groups. Since these peace negotiations were 
not successful, they resulted in a subsequent war. The fourth and final war of Eelam was 
successfully turned around the situation when the Sri Lankan government deployed the 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies to its full capacity. The Sri Lankan government also 
introduced newly formulated counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies to use all the available 
sources in its capacity to defeat the Tamil Tigers once and for all.48 
The brutality, never ending hostility and mass devastation, which was conducted 
by the Tamil Tigers, disrupted the core of the government and nation of Sri Lanka. One 
similar aspects that all insurgent groups use is the unconventional insurgent techniques or 
guerrilla warfare techniques, which includes violence, by small packs or groups of low 
level followers of the insurgent groups. Historically, the guerrilla war strategies have 
been very successful in eradicating unpopular insurgent groups because it heavily relies 
on the favours of the local residents for successful insurgent movements. These rebel 
groups use guerrilla war strategies to develop asymmetry, which is naturally involved in 
the domestic conflicts. The insurgents’ employ hit and run strategies against the 
weakness of the opponents.49  
In Sri Lanka’s case as well, the Tamil Tigers avoided significant engagements, 
improved their support for materials, and were able to gain popularity and backing from 
the few local residents. They made use of forests, mountainous areas, and urban and rural 
regions to hide their strategies and cover up their campsites. They were aimed towards 
disrupting the security of Sri Lankan civilians so that the residents would lose confidence 
in the capabilities of their government to provide public safety and stable situation to the 
civilians in the country. Therefore, majority of the times, the Tamil Tigers targeted on the 
country’s infrastructure, which was assumed to have a great impact on the basic needs of 
humans. The infrastructure, which were a major target for the Tamil Tigers  
 
 
were electricity generating plants, water reserves and filtration plants, water pumping 
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plants, food supply centres, petrol or gas or other fuel supply centres, treatments plants 
for sewage, and country’s transportation.50  
The Tamil Tigers also deployed criminal and coercive activities to disrupt public 
safety and security and collect funds for the activities carried out by the insurgent groups. 
These crimes involved, taking hostages, kidnapping, hijacking, extortion and robbery. 
The Tamil Tigers also attempted to attack and intimidate the equipment of national and 
public safety and security in order to disrupt the government activities and force it 
towards defensive attitude.51   
As the years pass by and the ground conditions changes, the Tamil Tigers 
established outstanding strategic improvements. The insurgent group was always utilising 
innovative methods and incorporated past lessons in order to innovate and improve their 
strategies through continuous trial and error. However, the Sri Lankan government and its 
military forces were not capable of formulating new and innovative strategies to 
counterbalance the rising insurgency of the Tamil Tigers. The Sri Lankan government 
was utilising the standards procedures for counterbalancing for quite some time. Since 
the Tamil Tigers were gaining ground within the country in the nineties, the Tigers 
developed new striking targets, operating areas, and new strategies to cause devastating 
effects on the nation and continue establishing the insurgency.52 Through these measures 
the Tamil Tigers managed to constantly disturb the designs of the Sri Lankan government 
and stayed in the media headlines.  
The failure of the Sri Lankan government to establish a sound and significant 
strategy for combating the Tamil Tigers was one of the reasons for the long life of LTTE 
rebel groups. One of the major reasons why Sri Lanka was unable to eradicate LTTE in 
its early stages was due to the international support for the rebel group. The IICT 
(International Institute for Counter Terrorism) explains that the international network and 
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support for the Tamil Tigers was not limited to one or two countries. It spanned more 
than 50 countries in central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.53   
The primary resource of funds and income was the Tamil Diaspora, who 
supported the LTTE financially through various channels like forced taxation or 
charitable donations. However, the Tamil Diaspora also provided financial support 
through other channels, both legal and illegal, including: gem trading, drug smuggling, 
stock investments, money and real estate markets, farm operations, finance corporations, 
and food joints located all over the world.54 They also acted as banks and loaned money 
to the Tamils for starting businesses in return for a share in their future revenues. This 
enormous financial machine was generating more that 80 million dollars annually. On the 
other hand, the Sri Lankan government was generating only eight million dollars 
annually for its operations. Therefore, the Tamil Tigers were capable of spending 
generously on innovative military equipment and propaganda. The LTTE was earning a 
monthly income of 385,000 U.S. dollars from UK, 650,000 U.S. dollars from Switzerland 
and 1,000,000 Canadian dollars from Canada 55  
Although the Sri Lankan government was able to defeat the Tamil Tigers 
eventually, the conflict has raised many political concerns, which is to provide solution 
for the grievances of the Tamil that led to the insurgency. Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa 
attempted to transform the features of the government and leadership entirely and 
employed the similar guerrilla warfare strategies that were adopted by the Tamil Tigers in 
the previous three wars of Eelam. The government also attempted to employ the 
strategies that the Tamil Tigers were using through the prolonged war, which resulted in 
violent streaks, along with militant propaganda and innovative guerrilla warfare 
strategies. The Sri Lankan government primarily focused on strategies to bring the entire 
nation under one umbrella by utilising the strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the 
nation and defeat the Tamil insurgency as a united nation.  
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A. TRANSFORMING THE POPULATION AS THE PRIMARY FOCUS 
In the first Elam war, the government was unable to transform the nation because 
they failed to make them the part of resolving the problem. Instead the Sri Lankan 
government deployed the divide and rule strategy which the British used in the past. This 
proved to be beneficial for the Sri Lankan Tamil, who were the largest minority groups. 
The Tamils were introduced to the academic systems, which were established by the 
British, and were provided with superior treatment for employment and even positions in 
the government. While, Sri Lanka did not stage a revolution in opposition of the British, 
unlike India, however; the Sinhalese, who were the majority of the population, became 
aggravated with the increasing differences.56  
In the beginning, the Sinhalese nationals were furious over the British settlements; 
however, after the Sri Lankan independence in the year 1948, the political philosophy of 
Sinhalese nations became more hostile towards the colonialism and channelled its way 
towards the Tamil residents.57 After the Sri Lankan independence, the country followed 
the parliamentary system for governance, which involves the majority communities, the 
Sinhalese nationals. They decided to represent the British government system, which 
were still followed after the independence. This caused for rise in inequity, which 
resulted in discrimination against the Tamils. This eventually caused the war. The 
Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam emerged from the TNT (Tamil New Tigers), the youth 
rebels of the Tamil Political Party and the TULF (Tamil United Liberation Front).58 Once 
firmly in power after 1990, the LTTE had little to gain from realizing reintegration in the 
Sri Lankan government and much to gain economically and politically from the struggle 
to gain an independent Tamil Eelam. Yet, it was not clear that the majority of Sri Lankan 
Tamils, still living in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, shared this dream of an LTTE-
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controlled independent Tamil state. This can be seen in the actions that the LTTE took 
while governing their own political space for about 20 years.59 
The Sri Lankan government failed protect legitimacy within the Tamil minorities 
during the second and third war. However, the discrimination against the ethnic minority 
continued over the years that resulted in unsuccessful attempts by the Sri Lankan 
government to eradicate the Tamil Tigers.60 Some of these discriminatory actions 
involve, hindering representation of Tamils in the government, lack of higher education 
access, and limited economic and financial opportunities. In the same time, the security 
forces continued harassing and embarrassing the Tamils, which resulted in rage against 
the Sri Lankan government.61 One of these measures was the erection of more and more 
security checkpoints to identify Tamil Tigers from the civilians. These armed forces also 
checked children in Tamil majority schools in order to identify LTTE penetration and 
infiltration within the schools. Due to this, the Tamil civilians had to carry their IDs 
everywhere and regularly agree to the interrogation process regarding their daily routine. 
Sinhalese political mobilization and ethnic empowerment at the ballot box led to a 
concurrent disenfranchisement of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka. Further, attempts 
over time to resolve many Tamils as futile saw the divisiveness by existing Tamil 
political groups. Tamil civil disobedience, peaceful in its intentions yet deadly in its 
outcome, was the result. The violent response by the state to the exercising of Tamil 
rights within Sri Lankan democracy further alienated many ethnic Tamils. This created a 
small but tight-knit youth movement that became convinced of militancy, and separation 
from the state, as the only way to protect Tamils. Above all, clearly, the Sri Lankan 
government agents had become, over time, more involved in the riots. This solidified the 
perception among more and more Tamils that the Sri Lankan state was not only 
disingenuous, but overtly violent toward Tamils. 
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However, in the fourth and final war, the government was able to receive 
sufficient support against the Tamil Tigers not just from the Sinhalese majorities but also 
from the minorities, including Tamils. The voters who elected President Rajapaksa 
believed that he was an expert politician, with authoritative presence, well-known smile 
and a pleasant personality. He was most often compared to the former president of U.S., 
Ronald Regan. When President Rajapaksa came to power in the year 2005, he promised 
to create a rejoiced nation with no sign of Tamil Tigers,62 which echoed with the voices 
of the devastated nation. As sureness and motivation grown, people directly helped the 
security forces and given very critical intelligence on LTTE activities and their locations 
around the country. Further, people voluntarily supported military and police by 
becoming surveillance teams of them (populace of the country considered themselves as 
a part of the military and police). People work whole day in order to support security 
forces to end this war as soon as possible and that was the only hope nation had. This 
motivational popular support and moral showed to be one of the primary features that led 
to defeat of the LTTE.  
B. POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP 
The first three wars of Eelam, which initiated in 1981 and lasted until 2004, were 
not successful because the Sri Lankan government failed to bring down the rising 
insurgency of the Tamil Tigers. All the previous three wars ended with peace talks 
between the government and the insurgent groups. During the time, the government was 
not able to achieve the most vital aim of the counterinsurgency strategy. First, to make 
sure the government is united and perceived as genuine and just by the Tamil minorities. 
Second, maintaining, protecting and enhancing the governance. Instead, the Sri Lankan 
government, which was primarily dominated by the Sinhalese, carried on its ethnic 
discrimination and racially prejudiced policies towards the Tamil minority. This proved 
to be the foundation of the 1983 violence, which resulted in increased support for the 
LTTE by the Tamil minority.63 The Tamil community viewed this scheme as a strategy 
                                                 




to weaken the Tamil concentration in the northern and eastern regions in order to amplify 
the dominance of Sinhalese community in all the regions of Sri Lanka.  
Since the Sri Lankan government failed to properly implement tactical and 
strategic counterinsurgency (COIN) techniques, its attempts to diminish the LTTE hold 
also failed in the past wars.64 Initially, the Sri Lankan government opted chasing the 
military strategy for eradicating Tamil Tigers by using standard operating procedures. 
Furthermore, the Sri Lankan government also faced defeat in expanding its tactics 
beyond the military strategies and developing international socioeconomic and political 
elements of counterbalancing the insurgent attacks. For instance, the government of Sri 
Lanka failed to provide a reasonable and alternative direction to the Tamil community, 
who were in the middle of the war between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan 
government and suffered the most. The government of Sri Lanka also failed to take 
drastic measures to ease the distress of the Tamil community in the northern and eastern 
regions. Additionally, the speed at which the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies were 
executed was quite slow and insufficient to counterbalance the ever-increasing 
international and local threat by the Tamil Tigers.65   
Intelligence Director monitored that the police was not capable of performing 
such vast operations because they lack both the experience and training for this situation. 
The police also lacked necessary technical, financial and other aspects of the resources 
for these situations. However, the police had limited capabilities for the execution of even 
insignificant tasks like monitoring and surveillance.  
The Sri Lankan government utilized all its funding to buy new and innovative 
military equipment such as armoured vehicles, patrolling vehicles, and aircraft, etc. from 
foreign countries and did not spend the resources in the Tamil regions for infrastructure 
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rebuilding or provide relief for the Tamil civilians who managed to escape the northern 
and eastern regions of the country, where the battle between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri 
Lankan government was on-going.  
Regardless of some achievements, the Sri Lankan government did not have 
sufficient manpower to clear eradicate the Tamil Tigers from the northern and eastern 
regions. For instance, around 30,000 armed officers reclaimed the Jaffna region from the 
Tamil Tigers during the “Jaya Sikuru operation” in 1995. However, the military started 
losing their foothold after 18 months and sustained heavy defeat by the Tamil Tigers.66 
Although, the Defense Minister did not declare the number of soldiers who lost their 
lives, but, the impact on the Sri Lankan army’s moral and strength was significant. In 
addition, according to Paul Harris of Jane’s Intelligence Review, as much as 20 percent 
(i.e. some 20,000 men and women had deserted the army). 
The Amnesty plan did bring back around 5,000 military officers; however, for 
most of them, their stay was temporary. Due to fresh desertions, recruitment simply could 
not keep up.67  
In the third war of Eelam, main concern for the military forces was the inadequate 
manpower and effective strategy to counterbalance the attacks of Tamil Tigers.68 
Additionally, the military forces in the Jaffna region were depleting, which later resulted 
in enormous administrative issues such as the frequent instances of dropping-out.69 
Although, during the years 1996 and 1999, the Sri Lankan government set up 14 police 
stations for public, who can handle regular civil enforcement in the Jaffna region so that 
the burden of the military can be shared since the military forces had to face numerous 
challenges to seize the region without sufficient military personnel.70 The recruitment for 
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the military forces was not able to meet the demands.71 The prolonged and harsh 
conditions of the war were the reasons for the hesitation of the civilians for joining. 
Those who were willing to join the military service were not well trained for the war. 
Due to this, the civilians as well as Sri Lankan government, both faced 
overwhelming attacks by the Tamil Tigers. Perhaps the most significant attacks were the 
1996 bombing of financial district of Sri Lanka in which 100 people were murdered and 
around 1500 were injured. Another such attack was in 1997 on the World trade centre in 
the Sri Lankan capital Colombo. And the most aggressive was in 1998 on the “Dalada 
Maligawa”, which is the nation’s most sacred temple as it is the place where the tooth of 
Lord Buddha is. These attacks were aimed at creating ethnic violence that was followed 
by the attack on Anuradhapura “Srimaha Bodiya,” another famous temple. Later the 
Tamil Tigers attempted to demolish more than half of the aircraft of a Sri Lankan airline 
in 2001. In the previous year the Tigers also infiltrated the military complex known as the 
Elephant Pass, which was known for its impregnability.72  Wars are not fought in the 
battlegrounds only. There are various other fronts like external support, intelligence, 
leadership and public support, as well as post-war measures that ensure successful 
implementation of COIN strategies. The shortage of unity of effort between military and 
governmental leadership of Sri Lanka from 1995 until 2004 resulted in defeat by the 
LTTE.  
However, Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa, after coming into power in 2005, 
attempted to transform the features of the government and leadership entirely and 
employed the similar guerrilla warfare strategies that were adopted by the Tamil Tigers in 
the previous three wars of Eelam. The government also attempted to employ the 
strategies that the Tamil Tigers were using through the prolonged war, which resulted in 
violent streaks, along with militant propaganda and innovative guerrilla warfare 
strategies. The Sri Lankan government primarily focused on strategies to bring the entire 
nation under one umbrella by utilising the strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the 
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nation and defeat the Tamil insurgency as a united nation. He also collaborated with the 
political leaders of the Tamil community, who were discriminated by the Tamil Tigers of 
the northern region. He also ordered the leaders of the military and security forces to 
conduct counterinsurgency measures to eradicate the Tamil Tigers without politicising 
the war. Perhaps the most important feat achieved by his leadership was that his 
government did not bend to the pressures of international communities to terminate the 
war against the Tamil Tigers.73 
During the final stages of the war (2006–2009), President Rajapaksa’s 
government was involved in constantly providing clear targets and objectives to the 
military and armed forces of Sri Lanka. Although the Tiger leadership in the east was not 
strong enough, the devoted LTTE militants fought the armed forces like conventional 
military and more like a rebel group, which proved to be a flawed strategy by the LTTE 
because they lacked sufficient manpower to conduct a conventional military attack.74 
After a few ferocious counterinsurgency (COIN) measures, which integrated aspects of 
RMAs (Revolutions In Military Affairs),75 the military forces of Sri Lanka were 
successful to reclaim Thoppigala, which was the largest active campsite of the Tamil 
Tigers in the eastern region. The counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, which was carried 
out in the eastern region, incorporated various methods of wars such as combined land, 
sea, and air operations. During Eelam war IV, the main strategy was killing or capturing 
the terrorists, instead of seizing more ground, because a reduction in the number of LTTE 
cadres automatically led to the ground being seized.  
The success of the Sri Lankan government in the eastern region helped the 
government to reclaim around 6500 kilometre of the area and eradicate the Tamil Tigers 
from that region. Later, the Defence Secretary directed the Sri Lankan Air force, Navy, 
Police and other security forces, along with Karuna’s east division, to concentrate on 
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threatening campaign in the northern region. In the fall of 2007, when the Wanni 
movement was rising, the Tamil Tigers fell short of human and financial resources and 
were facing enormous challenges to continue responding to the government COIN 
strategies.76 There were additional efforts undertaken to target this golden goose. For 
most of the 1980s and 1990s, the LTTE gained funding, political favour, held rallies, and 
enjoyed being viewed as a legitimate freedom movement. This was due to the efforts of 
the Tamil Diaspora that saw the LTTE as an extension of their desires for justice in Sri 
Lanka. It was only after the events of 9/11 that other countries with large Sri Lankan 
Tamil Diaspora populations took any action against curtailing the fundraising activities of 
the group. However, once started, these activities increased in number. 77 In 2001, Great 
Britain and Australia designated the LTTE as an FTO. The Patriot Act of 2001 and 
subsequent Anti-Terrorist Financing Act affected the LTTE in the U.S., the UK, and 
Canada. Originally, this act did not label the LTTE as a terrorist organization. 78 
Consequently, funds were not tracked and frozen like the various Islamic terror groups 
the act had intentionally targeted. However, in an effort to gain support for the Global 
War On Terrorism internationally, the United States added unrelated terrorist groups, and 
in October 2001 froze LTTE assets. Britain and Canada also began freezing LTTE assets 
in February and November of 2001, respectively. 
In addition, many Tamils declined to provide funds to the LTTE for fear of legal 
action. Law enforcement authorities also began to mobilize and interdict various elements 
of the Tamil Diaspora and the associated LTTE foreign offices. The LTTE occasionally 
used Tamil youth gangs in order to collect funds or deter Tamils antithetical to the cause. 
In October 2001, Canadian Police arrested 40 Tamil gang members in a series of raids in 
Toronto. In 2003, the Thai authorities arrested and imprisoned three Tamil LTTE 
operatives attempting to buy weapons in Thailand. This marked the first time Thai 
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authorities had interdicted Tamil weapons procurement in their country.79 In 2005, the 
British Charity Commission delisted the TROs’ UK office as a charitable organization. In 
2006, Canada proscribed the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, making it illegal 
to support or conduct fundraising on the groups’ behalf. In April 2006, the RCMP 
conducted a raid on the World Tamil Movement’s headquarters in Montreal.80 In the 
United States, a combined operation netted several LTTE-associated Tamils who were 
trying to bribe State Department officials, and purchase shoulder-fired surface-to-air 
missiles. 81 In 2006, the EU proscribed the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In 
2007, Intelsat Ltd., a Washington D.C.-based company, banned the Tamil Television 
Network from using its system. The network then moved to Paris, and began televising 
its LTTE propaganda again. However, in May 2007, French authorities shut it down, 
under the new provisions of the FTO designation that the EU adopted the previous year.82 
In April 2007, the leaders of the LTTEs’ office in Paris, and 13 others, were 
arrested on charges of “financing terrorism” and “criminal associations with a terrorist 
enterprise.” The LTTE then sent a replacement to France, to oversee operations. He was 
in turn arrested in September 2007 by French authorities.83 In April 2007, the FBI 
arrested Karunakaran Kandasamy, the head of the LTTE office in the United States. 
Evidence collected from the arrest alluded to a front organization, the World Tamil 
Coordinating Committee having raised millions for the LTTE. In May of 2007, 
Australian authorities arrested two LTTE Tamils who were involved in a fraudulent 
campaign to collect money for Tsunami relief victims. The relief organization was 
actually an LTTE front, and authorities seized over 520,000 USD in assets.84 In June 
2007, British authorities, for violating laws under the British Terrorism Act, arrested the 
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president of the British Tamil Association, Arunachalam Chrishanthakumar. A British 
court later froze all of his assets, worth four billion pounds sterling.85 
C. NON-WESTERN BIAS, INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT MACHINERY 
AND POLITICAL STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY 
The agenda of the Western policy had no concern for Sri Lanka. A UK based TV 
channel launched a program which was names, Sri Lanka’s killing field. It was produced 
by Channel four. This sparked a lot of controversy and generated numerous debates 
within Sri Lanka, which included high profile political and diplomatic leaders, foreign as 
well as local journalists.86 The government of Sri Lanka condemned the TV show as 
unreal and mere exaggeration, the international communities; Western nations in 
particular, were blaming the government of Sri Lanka for the increased violence within 
the country.    
The British government in particular was always blaming the government of Sri 
Lanka for the Eelam wars. The issue of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka was used as a 
focal point by these nations as a way to express their superiority in the matters of 
minority rights, civil accountability and human rights. All such statements remain limited 
to theory, and practice, as we can see, is a completely different and essentially 
paradoxical ballgame. 
The international nations, Western in particular, have not shown any concern for 
the causes of the Sri Lankan government. Leading those nations is, of course, U.S. the 
country has been accusing the government of Sri Lanka for not abiding by the 
humanitarian laws. These claims are majorly due to the factors, which produce the UN’s 
War Crimes Report, commonly called the Darusman Report. One of the most remarkable 
facts about this report is that it has somehow, intentionally or unintentionally, omitted the 
mass devastation and murders caused by the Tamil Tigers from 1983. Due to this fact 
most of the people do not know that facts regarding the crimes caused by the Tamil 
Tigers because the media and such reports have done a beautiful job in overlooking them. 
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The Tamil Tigers can be easily held by the IHL (International Humanitarian Law), 
however, the Western communities, the UN and Navi Pillai, intentionally or 
unintentionally, have managed to overlook this concern when the Tamil insurgency was 
at its peak. Perhaps the most important feat achieved by the Sri Lankan government was 
that it did not bend to the pressures of international communities to terminate the war 
against the Tamil Tigers. China and Russia were two nations who supported the Sri 
Lankan government throughout its counterinsurgency campaign and even in the security 
council of UN. This boosted the government’s confidence to continue the 
counterinsurgency measures towards the eradication of the LTTE. In the past 50 years, 
Sri Lanka has faced numerous challenges including the natural disasters and domestic 
wars. The political leaders and policy makers of Sri Lanka have been depending largely 
on foreign aid due to continuous adjustments in the planning and development of the 
policies of the country during the time when the Plan implementation Ministry was shut 
off. Contrary to the previous efforts, during the final war of Eelam, the government of Sri 
Lanka adopted tactical strategies to eradicate the Tamil Tigers once and for all. However, 
in previous years the government relied heavily on peace negotiations and terminated the 
counterinsurgency strategies that worsen the situation even further.87 Major attacks on 
the military and navy base camps were repelled very effectively and successfully. The 
counterbalancing measures were launched to re-open the gates of Mavilaru sluice and 
continued until the leadership and troops of the Tamil Tigers were completely eradicated. 
However, Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa, after coming into power in 2005, 
attempted to transform the features of the government and leadership entirely and 
employed the similar guerrilla warfare strategies that were adopted by the Tamil Tigers in 
the previous three wars of Eelam. 
Additionally, in 2006, the murder attempts of the Tamil Tigers against close 
confidant and Chief of Army in the month of April; the closing of the gates of Mavil by 
the Tamil Tigers in July; and the unsuccessful suicide attack on the brother of the 
President and Defense Secretary in December—they all proved to be encourage the 
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President to discard 2002 peace negotiations with the Tamil Tigers and President 
Rajapaksa attempted to transform. In the end, President Rajapaksa attempted for an all-
out final solution to the Tamil Tigers through military means. The counterinsurgency 
campaign, which was carried out in the eastern region, incorporated various methods of 
wars such as combined land, sea, and air operations and marine guerrilla warfare etc. 
These units and task forces infiltrated deep inside the control lines of Tamil Tigers. 
The murder of foreign minister of Sri Lanka in 2005, suicide bombs on army 
headquarters of Sri Lankas in 2006, and in the same year, attack on Trincomalee Harbour 
not only persuaded the uncompromising the Sri Lankan government but the Western 
communities as well, about the crimes committed by the Tamil Tigers. Consequently, 
after the events of 9/11 other countries took action against the Tamil Tigers. However, 
once started, these activities increased in number.  In 2001, Great Britain and Australia 
designated the LTTE as an FTO. The PATRIOT Act of 2001 and subsequent Anti-
Terrorist Financing Act affected the LTTE in the U.S., the UK and Canada. Originally, 
this act did not label the LTTE as a terrorist organization. However, in an effort to gain 
support for the Global War on Terrorism internationally, the United States added 
unrelated terrorist groups, and in October 2001 froze LTTE assets. Britain and Canada 
also began freezing LTTE assets in February and November of 2001, respectively. China 
and Russia were two nations who supported the Sri Lankan government throughout its 
counterinsurgency campaign and even in the security council of UN. This boosted the 
government’s confidence to continue the counterinsurgency measures towards the 
eradication of the LTTE. 
Summarily, Sri Lanka’s political leadership between 1995 until 2004, were not 
successful because the Sri Lankan government failed to bring down the rising insurgency 
of the Tamil Tigers. All the previous three wars ended with peace talks between the 
government and the insurgent groups. During the time, the government was not able to 
achieve the most vital aim of the counterinsurgency strategy. However, Sri Lankan 
President Rajapaksa, after coming into power in 2005, attempted to transform the features 
of the government and leadership entirely and employed the similar guerrilla warfare 
strategies, which were adopted by the Tamil Tigers in the previous three wars of Eelam. 
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The government also chosen capable, strongly patriotic characters to command the 
security forces by that he attempted to employ the strategies that the Tamil Tigers were 
using through the prolonged war, which resulted in violent streaks, along with militant 
propaganda and innovative guerrilla warfare strategies.  
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IV. THE SRI LANKA MILITARY STRATEGY AND APPARATUS 
Much of the COIN success against the LTTE stems from the efforts of the 
military apparatus in tackling the guerrilla fighters. The Sri Lankan Army saw drastic 
transformation from EELAM I to EELAM IV in terms of fighting tactics. An 
amalgamation of conventional and guerrilla tactics that ensured the ultimate destruction 
and defeat of the LTTE replaced the conventional methods of the army. This chapter 
examines the efforts of the security forces, the Sri Lankan Army, Air force and Navy in 
combating the insurgents. Also, the use of technology for the purpose of surveillance and 
war by the armed forces has also been discussed. The military apparatus worked with 
great unity and sustained efforts throughout to ensure that the country get free from the 
clutches of the LTTE. 
A. TRANSFORMATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM 
CONVENTIONAL TO COMBINATION OF CONVENTIONAL AND 
GUERRILLA TACTICS 
During the initial stages of the Sri Lankan terrorism, the government lacked unity 
in the orders and directions with the military forces to collaborate on any 
counterinsurgency strategy. The Sri Lankan government only wanted to respond to the 
threats by the Tamil Tigers with military power. It was not concerned with the political 
aspects, which can be used to the issue. Although the history of ethnic rioting in post-
independence Sri Lanka began as a series of legislative measures that the Tamil 
community perceived to be antithetical to Tamil interests, Sinhalese and Sri Lankan 
government reactions to Tamil grievances eventually sparked widespread violence that 
physically and emotionally destroyed Tamil communities. 
In the early years of 1985, the intelligence director and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs South Asia Desk Director presented a combined proposal to the Sri Lankan 
President in order to develop a representative committee of all the agencies to discuss the 
question about the ethnic minorities.88 However, the government never responded to their 
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submitted proposal. Nonetheless, the intelligence director believed it would be beneficial 
if the government worked with various agencies, which also helped them in 
understanding that the Indians largely supported the Tamil Tigers. Since 1986 until 1989, 
only the National Security Council was the permanent organisation, which discussed the 
issue of the Tamil Tigers and the methods of combating against their insurgent groups. 
This organisation met every week to discuss the latest events of the LTTE uprising.89 The 
purpose of these meetings was to discuss how the Sri Lankan government counterbalance 
the insurgency terrorisation through counterinsurgency measures of military and armed 
forces.  
The intelligence director of that time stated that the Sri Lankan government has 
chosen the asymmetrical strategy because NSC hardly had the aspiration to hold the 
totality of the issue. The question of ethnicity is multi-dimensional; therefore, it should be 
resolved by formulating a logical strategy, which requires both political as well as 
diplomatic leaders, along with strategies enforced by the military and armed forces.90  
Siilar to DI’s opinion, the Secretory Defence also explained during the interview that the 
lack of a coherent and logical strategy is because of the failed attempts of then 
government to develop and employ a stable and fully functioning organisation or 
committee, which would have resulted in bringing all the representatives and specialists 
of all the agencies that were associated in this war, under one roof.91 There are various 
other fronts like external support, intelligence, leadership and public support, as well as 
post-war measures that ensure successful implementation of COIN strategies. The 
shortage of unity of effort between military and governmental leadership of Sri Lanka 
from 1995 until 2004 resulted in defeat by the LTTE. 
Initially, the Sri Lankan government did not receive any external support and 
when it did, it was not sufficient to counterbalance the terrorism of the LTTE. During the 
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mid of first Eelam battle, the first major external support came in the way of Indian 
peacekeeping force, also known as the IPKF. The intervention of India in this conflict put 
extra pressure on the Sri Lankan government; therefore, the Sri Lankan government had 
to terminate the operation against the Tamil militants. Thousands of Indian troops as a 
Peace Keeping Force landed in Sri Lanka to help with the conflict as a result of signed 
peace agreement between two countries in 1987. The attempt of Indian Peace Keeping 
Force (IPKF) to neutralize the Tamil Tiger failed. As soon as the Indian Peace Keeping 
Force (IPKF) left the country, the Tamil Tigers got hold of the northern and eastern 
provinces of the island. Government again made sufficient efforts to hold peace talks 
with the LTTE, which did not result as anticipated. The small operations later became 
fully blown war. The LTTE often viciously targeted and murdered the police.92 In 
October, during the operation in Jaffna, IPKF faced major upsets when it was responding 
to the attacks of the Tamil Tigers on the Sri Lankan government agencies. IPKF soon 
found its troops heavily insufficient and at times they were less than half as compared to 
the Tamil Tigers. Not only IPKF lacked personnel but they were also deprived of 
equipments, machinery and ammunition etc. They also had little knowledge about 
guerrilla war tactics. Overall, the mission of IPKF was poorly failed and the strategically 
executed tactics of Tamil Tiger soon overwhelmed them.93 The Tamil Tigers made use of 
underground mines, human guards and penetrated into the control lines of the IPKF. 
They caused numerous fatalities, which shattered the peacekeeping hopes from the IPKF. 
Such brave acts from the Tamil Tigers strengthened their support within the Tamil 
civilians.94  
Long after employing the counterinsurgency techniques of IPKF, the Tamil 
Tigers rose to the strength of 32,000 fighters and managed to capture the region of Jaffna. 
However, the IPKF had to face severe challenges. The Indian troops lacked the desire of 
effort and unity of command as every attempt to counteract the insurgents was made 
possible through politics and diplomacy. Additionally, Indian and Sri Lankan government 
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were not in an agreement over the threat of the Tamil Tigers, whether to execute 
Prabhakaran, and how to eradicate LTTE controlled areas. After the IPKF pull out in 
1990, the LTTE developed into a fearsome insurgency. Using the funding provided by 
the Diaspora, they rose in number and notoriety. They controlled large areas in northern 
Sri Lanka Subsequent operations by the Sri Lankan military throughout the 1990s and 
early 2000s were typically met with disaster as the LTTE continually outmanoeuvred 
them on land, sea, and air. Once firmly in power after 1990, the LTTE had little to gain 
from realizing reintegration in the Sri Lankan government and much to gain 
economically and politically from the struggle to gain an independent Tamil Eelam. Yet, 
it was not clear that the majority of Sri Lankan Tamils, still living in north and east Sri 
Lanka, shared this dream of an LTTE-controlled independent Tamil state. This can be 
seen in the actions that the LTTE took while governing their own political space for 
about 20 years.  
Meanwhile, the Tamil Tigers expanded their weapons and battle equipment to 
commence major militant operations in achieving their objectives. They also commenced 
marine attacks on military and armed froes base camps alongside the land troops. 
Same as the first campaign period, the government developed capabilities of the 
security forces, but they continued to lack the resources and potentials to effectively 
wipe-out the LTTE. By 1999, the Army had increased her numbers to 120,000 heads, 
with some 75,000 to 85,000 in operational duty. “In addition, the air force and navy grew 
to 17,000 and 15,000, respectively. The government also bolstered its police force, which 
stood at 50,000. At the time, the LTTE numbered around 16,000 to 17,000 active 
members.”95 “However, number of supporters was more than the active cadres and the 
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the government spent 37 percent of its budget fighting the insurgency. However, 
Sri Lanka spent little resources rebuilding damaged infrastructure in Tamil areas or 
provide relief to those who fled the North and East where government forces clashed with 
the LTTE.”96  
During the third war of Eelam, the military and armed forces of Sri Lanka did not 
have sufficient troops, training and experience to combat the Tamil Tigers effectively. 
The military were not able to sustain the re-captured regions and move forward into the 
regions of the rebel groups at the same time.97 In addition to this, the military adopted 
standard operating strategies to an unconventional war. This is the reason why the war 
against of LTTE was so prolonged. Many as a whack-a-mole syndrome described this 
condition. It means that if military services were capable of clearing one area from LTTE 
control, the Tamil Tigers would re-surface in other area. The military and armed forces 
were not capable of moving forward and eradicate the Tamil Tigers once and for all.98  
In 2000, during the months of March and July, the UNP leader Ranil 
Wickremesinghe met with then President Kumaratunga more than 12 times. These 
meetings were aimed at reviewing the terms and conditions for the decentralisation 
process. After a long debate and deep analyses, Ranil Wickremesinghe and President 
Kumaratunga came to an agreement. The Tamil political leaders in the coalition 
government backed away from the agreement. These Tamil leaders originally agreed to 
the terms of the agreement back in the year 1997. This also proved to be one of the 
barriers to the resolution. Another factor that caused to be a barrier was the lack of direct 
contact of Sri Lankan government with the leaders of LTTE. The leadership of the Tamil 
Tigers also disagreed to the decentralisation process because, according to them, they 
were not involved when the government was making decisions. Another reason for 
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disagreement was that the Tamil Tigers demanded that the northern regions and the 
eastern regions should be unified and their authority should be given to the Tamil 
community.  
A vital element that resulted in the loss of popularity of LTTE in the eastern 
region of the country and its inadequate combating capacities was the defection of 
Colonel Karuna in 2004. He was responsible for leading an army of around 500 to 600 
devoted men alongside the government. This had a profound impact on the abilities of the 
Tamil Tigers as well as the counterinsurgency strategies of the Rajapaksa government.99 
According to the Sergei De Silva Ranasinghe from Future Directions International, the 
LTTE east wing, which was led by Karuna, went subversive with its approximately 500 
to 600 fighters. They were also heavily engaged in military operations against the Tamil 
Tigers. This division within the LTTE resulted in the Tamil Tiger’s attempt to modify 
their conventional tactics of operations in order to respond to the growing strength of Sri 
Lankan government and Colonel Karuna.  
The Tamil Tigers of the eastern wing were operating in a conventional manner 
instead of fighting like a rebel group. They arrested, tortured and murdered numerous 
civilians with the suspicion of involvement in the LTTE Karuna wing or the government. 
Although the Tiger leadership in the east was not strong enough, the devoted LTTE 
militants fought the armed forces like conventional military and more like a rebel group, 
which proved to be a flawed strategy by the LTTE because they lacked sufficient 
manpower to conduct a conventional military attack.  
To win the war on the LTTE, the Army strategically adopted the unique and usual 
irregular warfare tactics that also commissioned and mastered by the LTTE, and began 
using these tactics to supplement its major military manoeuvre against the attacks 
conducted by the LTTE, who were also applied a conventional strategy. The government 
also attempted to employ the strategies that the Tamil Tigers were using through the 
prolonged war, which resulted in violent streaks, along with militant propaganda and 
innovative guerrilla warfare strategies. The Sri Lankan government primarily focused on 
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strategies to bring the entire nation under one umbrella by utilising the strategy of 
winning the hearts and minds of the nation and defeat the Tamil insurgency as a united 
nation. He also collaborated with the political leaders of the Tamil community, who were 
discriminated by the Tamil Tigers of the northern region. He also ordered the leaders of 
the military and security forces to conduct counterinsurgency measures to eradicate the 
Tamil Tigers without politicising the war. Perhaps the most important feat achieved by 
his leadership was that his government did not bend to the pressures of international 
communities to terminate the war against the Tamil Tigers.  
Initially, the Sri Lankan government opted chasing the military strategy for 
eradicating the Tamil Tigers by using standard operating procedures. Furthermore, the Sri 
Lankan government also faced defeat in expanding its tactics beyond the military 
strategies and developing international socioeconomic and political elements of 
counterbalancing the insurgent attacks. For instance, the government of Sri Lanka failed 
to provide a reasonable and alternative direction to the Tamil community, who were in 
the middle of the war between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government and 
suffered the most. The government of Sri Lanka also failed to take drastic measures to 
ease the distress of the Tamil community in the northern and eastern regions. 
Additionally, the speed at which the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies were executed 
was quite slow and insufficient to counterbalance the ever-increasing international and 
local threat by the Tamil Tigers. The Armed and Military forces of Sri Lanka deployed a 
combined RMA strategy, which included RMA I, RMA III and RMA IV. The war 
inclined more towards the guerrilla methods of warfare in order to counterbalance the 
combined RMA strategies of the Tamil Tigers. 
By late 2006, the figures of SIOT-trained soldiers had increased by 1:6 ratios 
prior to the commencement of hostilities. The counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, 
which was carried out in the eastern region, incorporated various methods of wars such as 
combined land, sea, and air operations, SIOT (Special Infantry Operation Team) units, 
special task forces and marine guerrilla warfare etc. These units and task forces infiltrated 
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deep inside the control lines of the Tamil Tigers.100 SIOT (Special Infantry Operation 
Team) units comprised of very experienced sophisticated and well-trained officers who 
had the ability to operate separately for a little time. These soldiers can be pushed into the 
forests in the beginning of the battle. Commandos and special military forces can be sent 
after them for support to catch Tamil tiger off guard and defeat them. 101 These 
modifications led to a recharged Sri Lankan Army, which chased the LTTE out of the 
eastern province initially and then from the Northern Province.  
Full-scale aggression arose in August 2006 when the LTTE shut down the 
Mavilaru sluice gate, which is in the Trincomalee region, in July of 2006. Due to this, 
more than 30,000 civilians in the east region were left without the supply of water. This 
caused severe deprivation of fresh drinking water for Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese and 
also for the rice fields that require a huge supply of water.102 In turn, the Sri Lankan 
Army launched a counter attack was aimed to reclaim the Mavilaru sluice gate and open 
supply of drinking water for the residents. However, this operation was delayed and 
launches in a number of phases. It was aimed to counteract for the major attack at the 
Muhamalai by the Tamil Tigers in August of 2006. At that time, Muhamalai was the 
country’s national front in the northern region.  
The Sri Lankan army further incorporated effective and strategic operations to 
counteract the threats that were posed by the Tamil Tigers. Due to this, the Tamil Tigers 
had to rethink the strategies they need to adopt; they chose the traditional rebel strategies, 
which was in complete contrast to their more conventional strategies that they adopted 
earlier in the year 2006. The Tamil Tigers re-launched the militant activities in the 
Vavuniya region to respond to the operations conducted by the Special Forces and 
military attacks of Sri Lankan national army. To balance the lack of strategic 
effectiveness, the Tamil Tigers relied heavily on its relatively young wing, the Air Tigers, 
in order to protect the Tiger forces in different parts of the country. These aircraft were 
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also used for the purpose of suicide bombings and assassinations to launch less intense 
yet deadly attacks throughout the country. The aim of these attacks was to target famous 
politicians, significant government officials, military officials as well as vital 
infrastructure of the country.103  In general, the entire counterinsurgency strategy of Sri 
Lankan government was to overwhelm the Tamil Tigers with the combined impact of 
both conventional as well as guerrilla combat strategies. Massive coordinated missile 
attacks were also launched effectively to target the Tamil Tigers. All these measures were 
taken based on the information provided by the ground forces, and technological 
innovations such as the UAV and the interception of communication etc. Such aggressive 
military actions deployed by the Sri Lankan government forced the LTTE to take 
defensive measures.  
The government’s expenditure on defense inclined. In the year of 2007, Sri Lanka 
was a relatively unsound nation, regarding the economy. The island country had spent 
over one billion U.S. dollars in defense. The next year the country spent over 1.48 billion 
U.S. dollars and in 2009, it spent 1.6 billion U.S. dollars.104  This assisted the efforts of 
Defense Secretary, “Commander of the Army and other two service commanders in 
transforming and enhancing the capabilities of the Sri Lankan Army, Navy [and Air 
Force].”105 With these funds the military was capable of purchasing military equipment. 
The new annual budget also incorporated the funds for five new segments of the Sri 
Lankan Army, which was going to confront the Tamil Tigers.106 While the army was 
transforming into a war oriented and ordered organisation, the air force and the naval 
forces were also developed its air and sea power capabilities in order to counterbalance 
the Tamil Tiger successfully on air and in the sea.  
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Through the approach of Eelam War IV, the government improved the security 
forces, which allowed the Sri Lankan forces to confront the LTTE through many 
directions and influence them to stretch their cadres thin. Further, the military avoided 
usual irregular warfare tactics and workout training on special operations and small group 
tactics, which helped military forces to counter the LTTE conventional strategies and 
accordingly organized offensives. When LTTE brock out Eelam war IV, they believed 
that they could match the Sri Lanka military. This over confidence and carelessness 
toppled the rebel’s balance of power and given much favors to the government forces. By 
April 2007, security forces had taken the total control of strategic A-5 highway in the 
East after 15 years. The military forces of Sri Lanka were successful to reclaim 
Thoppigala, which was the largest active campsite of the Tamil Tigers in the eastern 
region. By June of 2007, military officers overran the operational base of the Tamil 
Tigers in Batticaloa in the eastern region of the country and managed to capture 
additional campsites to the northern and southern area. During Eelam war IV, the primary 
military strategy was killing or apprehending the LTTE rebels than going for the land 
because a reduction of LTTE cadres involuntarily led to easy seizing of the ground. 
Within a year, the success of Sri Lankan government in the eastern region helped the 
government to reclaim around 6500 kilometre of the area and eradication of the Tamil 
Tigers from that region. Later, the Defence Secretary directed the Sri Lankan Air Force, 
Navy, Police and other security forces, along with Karuna’s east division, to concentrate 
on threatening campaign in the northern region.107 
The military advanced through LTTE defences and capture the strategically 
important Mannar Island in June 2008 and, few weeks after, taken the control of four 
more LTTE bases including their vital sea tiger base Vedithaltivu. The military mostly 
focused on the Jaffna region in order to reclaim the Poonarien Isthmus—also called the 
Elephant Pass—and Kilinochchi, which was considered the capital of the Tamil Tigers. 
The capturing of these regions proved to be strategically significant for the military 
operations and resulted in the demise of the Tamil Tigers in January of 2009. 
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As discussed previously, the Western communities helped in seizing the offshore 
networks of the Tamil Tigers. With the lack of funds, the Tamil Tigers were severely 
weakened. The flow of funds and military equipment was stopped. Additionally, the Sri 
Lankan Naval force successfully fought against the weakened the Tamil Tigers due to the 
increased capabilities of the Sri Lankan Naval force. For instance, during the years of 
2006 and 2007, the Sri Lankan Naval force was successful in destroying 11 trucks and six 
container ships, which contained weapons, military equipment and hardware.108 
Additionally, further into the war, the Sri Lankan Naval force disrupted the 
communication line of the Tamil Tigers from Tamil Nadu. This action deprived the 
Tamil Tigers from their much required weapons, military equipment and hardware. 
One of the significant progresses for the Sri Lankan government was the 
introduction of Small Boat Squadron (SBS). These squads implemented the guerrilla war 
strategies to use against the Tamil marine tigers. Their main objective was to fight the sea 
Tiger wing of the LTTE. Just like the strategies adopted in the eastern region of the 
country, the Tamil Tigers were forced to implement the defensive military strategy and 
heavily depended on the strategic lines. According to the Army Commander, the SIOT 
troops successfully infiltrated the control lines of the Tamil Tigers and caught them by 
surprise and eradicating them once and for all.109 
By the year 2008, the Wanni movement was rising. The Sri Lankan Army 
deployed a similar strategy in the eastern region, implemented using past lessons learned 
in the region. Sri Lankan Army Commander utilized the strategy for inflicting high 
number of fatalities of the Tamil Tigers and conducting military operations constantly 
without providing the chance for the opponent. Sri Lankan army commenced the military 
measures over several fronts to use the British strategy of Divide and conquer. The 
SIOTs, Special Forces, Commandos, and Airmobile Brigade, with well-coordinated 
artillery and air, facilitated to succeed the new military strategy. 
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In the month of January, the Sri Lankan Army commander deployed three task 
forces to the northeastern coastline of the country. This applied added pressure on the 
Tamil Tigers.110 Later the Sri Lankan Army deployed two more task forces to move from 
the Jaffna region to Kilinochichi to shut the northern side of the border to Jaffna region. 
Three more task forces were deployed from the southern region. During all this time, the 
Sri Lankan Army continued fighting the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan Navy continued 
fighting the Sea Tigers and sea capabilities of LTTE, while hindering all the possible 
LTTE sea routes to the country. Yet despite their successes and wealth, the LTTE 
eventually came to an end. In May of 2009, after a two-and-a-half year military 
offensive, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces surrounded the last of the insurgents as they 
attempted a desperate last stand, ironically enough, on the beaches in Mullaitivu. The 
LTTE was once a unit of over 10,000 battle-hardened guerrillas. However, the remnants 
that attempted this act of desperation consisted of many conscripted young children, who 
held civilians as human shields. Meanwhile, their core leadership made desperate calls 
from their makeshift bunkers for American or British protection upon surrender. 
Arguably, they were only a shell of what was once considered to be one of the most 
feared insurgent movements of the modem age. This last stand resulted in the death and 
capture of the last of the holdouts.  
Improvement and development in the logistics and services boosted soldier 
morale, damaged the insight of the terrorist’s strength, and finally caused an end to the 
terrorism. Lack of logistically feasible capabilities ruled out consistent defensive 
strategies. Brilliant counteracting techniques will always defeat flawed strategies. 
Vellupillai Prabhakaran failed to anticipate the strength of the superior opponent forces. 
He did not formulate a defence strategy and support strategy, which the militant or rebel 
forces require during the insurgency movements. This illustrates that his strategies were 
flawed and failed to foresee the need for a revised strategy. The Tamil Tigers in the 
previous campaigns always successfully repelled the Eelam War I, II and III conducted 
by the Sri Lankan government. Major attacks on the military and navy base camps were 
repelled very effectively and successfully. The counterbalancing measures were launched 
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to re-open the gates of Mavilaru sluice and continued until the leadership and troops of 
Tamil Tigers were completely eradicated. During these successful operations the Tamil 
Tigers were defeated because they did not anticipate the strength of the superior opponent 
and did not revise their strategies. They also did not anticipate the new tactics and 
strategies that were adopted by the military and armed forces of Sri Lanka. After 
eradicating the leadership and troops of the Tamil Tigers, the humanitarian operation was 
terminated by the Sri Lankan government on nineteenth of May 2009. After almost 20 
years, the Sri Lankan government was able to regain total control of Sri Lanka.111 
Transformation of military tactics and strategies from conventional to irregular 
warfare reached remarkable success by the security forces as well as the government. 
These strategies also decreased military casualty figures considerably and spared more 
battalions to generate strong reserves for each front. Furthermore, multidirectional and 
surprise offensives and a frequent change of tactics kept the LTTE on the run which 
ultimately led to continuous confusion and loss of central command within the LTTE 
system, paving to the success. Although clear vision, mission and ultimate objective 
helped the military to succeed superb victories, they could not have reached their task 
without the support and backing of friendly foreign nations like China and Pakistan, and 
particularly, the Indian unbiased policy. During the Eelam War I, II, and III, India had 
blocked or pressure the government to stop the military offensives whenever LTTE was 
about to be crushed or deteriorated; but at the Eelam War IV, the government strategy 
abled to ally itself with Indian policies and maintained Indian interference away from the 
military actions. However, government all ways kept India informed on all events. “The 
Indian role during the Elam War IV tremendously helped the success of the campaign, 
even though they did not provide any physical military assistance except routine military 
training, which they had also provided during the Eelam Wars I, II and III.”112 
                                                 
111 Ragavan, Peace Process in Sri Lanka, Challenges and Opportunities, 72–93. 
112 Shanika. “President’s clear vision, key factor in eradicating terrorism. 
 60
B. USE OF TECHNOLOGY COORDINATED INTELLIGENCE NET WORK 
In the first Eelam war, the army of Sri Lanka had to deal with the reinforced 
uprising by the Tamil Tigers. The Tamil Tiger used all the new and innovative technical 
equipment and military hardware that were accessible at that moment. However, they 
were not capable of controlling the condition as Tamil Tiger, with the new and innovative 
technical equipment and military hardware that were accessible had developed from a 
little group of devoted fighters to a conservative military force.113 
The use of innovative technical equipment in the second war was similar to the 
first war. A lot of effort has been invested in the intelligence aspect of counterinsurgency 
principles, which is a clear indication of its importance.114 However, while most of the 
internal and external government’s military forces have needed to work out intelligence 
strategies through third parties or through the use of technology, insurgency groups need 
fewer or no third- party or technology assistance, and so have direct access to all 
intelligence aspects. The Tamil Tiger used all the new and innovative technical 
equipment and military hardware that were accessible at that moment. However, the Sri 
Lankan government did not have enough resources or technical resources to counteract 
the Tamil Tiger attacks.115 “For example, the LTTE’s assassination of Sri Lanka 
President Ranasinghe Premadasa in January 1993 reflects how intelligence officers failed 
to uncover plots, particularly against prominent political figures.”116 
The transformation of Sri Lanka’s Air Force and Navy also played a crucial part 
in the annihilation of the Tamil Tigers. During the third Eelam war, Sri Lanka’s Navy 
was challenged to respond to the marine strategies of the Tamil Tigers. When the 
ceasefire agreement collapsed, Tamil Tiger managed to build a very effective and 
efficient aircraft to assist their ground troops and launch air attacks. To respond to this, 
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the navy had to employ extensive R&D campaigns. This effort created the “Small Boats” 
Concept, which principally applied against the LTTE’s irregular sea tactics but on a far 
greater scale. This newly invented concept helped Navy SBS’s to perform missions in 
varying levels of sea. And Air Force developed her radar and surveillance system to 
detect LTTE aircraft from longer distance and introduce new strategies and innovative 
methods to provide close air support including combat supply. 
Around 30,000 armed officers reclaimed the Jaffna region from the Tamil Tigers 
during the Jaya Sikuru operation in 1995. However, the military started losing their 
foothold after 18 months and sustained heavy defeat by the Tamil Tigers.117 Although, 
the Defense Minister did not declare the number of soldiers who lost their lives, but, the 
impact on the Sri Lankan army’s moral and strength was significant.118 “Later that same 
year, the LTTE blew up a commuter train killing 78 passengers and conducted a suicide 
assault on the capital city’s port.”119 The victory of these attacks echoed the Sri Lanka 
security aerators’ ineffectiveness in gathering and handling intelligence. The role of 
Police intelligence division’s poor organisation and the unity of effort was one of the 
major reasons for these gaps.  
Information gathered by the intelligence services of the government and army did 
not always flow down to the police that patrol the streets. Sri Lanka’s Directorate of 
Internal Intelligence (DII) and the police’s Special Branch, two units tasked with 
organizing intelligence operations. The problems aroused due to lack of manpower led 
intelligence agents to fail their missions most of the time. As a result countrymen lost 
confidence on the military’s’ capability to fight against LTTE. Consequently, Information 
flows were controlled as well. Dissenting opinions to LTTE were considered as 
antithetical to LTTE objectives, and were therefore subdued. Meanwhile, the LTTE 
began to set up information venues. These included the Tamil Television Network, 
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Tamilnet.com and various postings on shared media sites such as YouTube.com. These 
sites or the imbedded information therein, are considered by many to be the propaganda 
of the LTTE.  
Dr. Rohan Gunaratna explains that the attack “revealed the weakness of strategic 
and tactical intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination and review and second, force 
protection, there was no prioritization of intelligence gathering, projection and sharing to 
erode the LTTE network.”120 Poorly incorporated systems and inability allowed the 
insurgents, over the course of a year, to launch a wide range of intelligence agencies in 
Colombo. Surprisingly, there were no true changes in the security setting after the attack. 
Dr. Fair explained that the idea of the Sri Lankan defence is to raise the quantity of 
military guards, instead of making improvements in the actual safety and security 
measures. Efforts of the government to stop propaganda of Tamil Tiger proved to be 
useless. LTTEs employed a partially authorized political infrastructure, including 38 
offices throughout the world, in countries such as South Africa and Japan.121 The rebels 
exploited technology such as the Internet, satellites, telephones, and fax machines to 
deliver routing news related to the Eelam war to the various domestic and international 
locations. On the other hand, government continuously struggled in an arrangement of 
censorship and red tape that rarely allowed for its victories to be publicized internally, let 
alone the other nations. Information flows were controlled as well. Dissenting opinions to 
LTTE were considered as antithetical to LTTE objectives, and were therefore subdued. 
Meanwhile, the LTTE began to set up information venues. These included the Tamil 
Television Network, Tamilnet.com and various postings on shared media sites such as 
YouTube.com. These sites or the imbedded information therein, are considered by many 
to be the propaganda of the LTTE. Therefore, while there were virtually no links between 
the LTTE and the Diaspora in 1983, by at least 2007, there were several connections that 
gave the Diaspora access to information on the situation in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, since 
the LTTE allegedly controlled these links, the information provided to the Diaspora was 
in complete support of LTTE goals and activities. Because of this, many members of the 
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Tamil Diaspora openly supported the LTTE. However, globally organized information 
sharing network played a vital role in pinning down the activities of Tamil diaspora as 
well as the LTTE’s political and arms transport activates. In that, the U. S. played a major 
role. 
Perhaps the most important feat achieved by the Sri Lankan government was that 
it did not bend to the pressures of international communities to terminate the war against 
the Tamil Tigers. China and Russia were two nations who supported the Sri Lankan 
government throughout its counterinsurgency campaign and even in the security council 
of UN. This boosted the government’s confidence to continue the counterinsurgency 
measures towards the eradication of the LTTE. In the past 50 years, Sri Lanka has faced 
numerous challenges including the natural disasters and domestic wars. The political 
leaders and policy makers of Sri Lanka have been depending largely on foreign aid due to 
continuous adjustments in the planning and development of the policies of the country. 
As a whole, the case of Sri Lanka reinforces that a cohesive and united military 
effort is required to beat the insurgents. An integrated system permitted the armed force 
and SLG to establish an extensive intelligence apparatus that ultimately led to the defeat 
of the LTTE. Furthermore, the assistance of other countries, in terms of military and 
moral support played an important part in successfully employing COIN strategies.  
The Sri Lankan government successfully turned around the situation when the Sri 
Lankan government deployed the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies to its full 
capacity. The Sri Lankan government also introduced newly formulated 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies to use all the available sources in its capacity to 
defeat the Tamil Tigers once and for all. 
Therefore, if both external resource structures were interdicted to a certain degree, 
and control over political space was wrested away, even temporarily, the insurgent 
movement would inevitably crash. Adversely, the opposite may also be true. In this case, 
an insurgent movement that does not rely upon external resource structures may not be 
reliant upon control over political space. Consequently, they may become tied to local 
expectations and values out of sheer necessity, and hence not susceptible to local losses 
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of legitimacy. Therefore, large conventional pitched battles to wrest away political space, 
coupled with attempts to interdict respective external resource structures will have no 
effect upon the insurgent organization. To a degree, this lesson seems to be absent from 
many works that catalogue the contributing factors of the LTTEs’ demise. 
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V. STRATEGIC MEASURES ON MEDIA AND RESETTLEMENT 
The cause-and-effect relationships that constitute wars are not limited to the 
battlefields. The fact of the matter remains that war is a multilateral engagement between 
opposing parties that face off on numerous fronts other than the battlefield. In this regard, 
post-war measures such as those brought forth as a result of COIN strategies are critically 
imperative. The relevance of the media’s role and relevance in this regard is critically 
imperative. The COIN strategies that were developed and implemented by Sri Lanka 
were significantly different when compared to traditional COIN strategies. The attribute 
that set apart Sri Lanka’s COIN strategy is that these strategies made exceptionally good 
use of the media. These strategies identified and utilized the media as a resource that 
could provide the competitive edge that was required to win the war. The Eelam wars 
present significant evidence regarding the role of the media in wars. However, it merits 
highlighting that the defeat of LTTE could not have come around without the role of the 
media. 
The president chose to make use of the lessons of the past by developing and 
implementing a COIN strategy that went beyond the battlefield and chose to bring 
together resources that were not commonly associated with war. 
A. EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
The LTTE was declared a SDTG (Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group) 
by the U.S. and as a result, the SLG managed to receive a significant degree of external 
support. This led to a direct dismantling of the international money generating operations 
of the Tamil Tigers.122 In addition, it also had a direct implication on the purchasing 
operations as well.123 
Eelam IV was mainly driven by an operations-first mentality from 2006 to 2009. 
The underlying philosophy behind this approach was to make use of military capacity 
instead of directly employing military force. The use of military capacity allowed for the 
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uprooting of the military strength of the Tamil Tigers and helped to ensure that the Tamil 
Tigers did not manage to come forth as jeopardy to the safety of the GOSL military and 
the control over the country’s governance. In this regard, the SLA began operations from 
the southern regions that were known to be under the government’s control. The usage of 
these regions helped to provide the SLA with the stepping-stone that it desperately 
needed in order to put a crack in the LTTE. This approach was continued until dominance 
over the region was regained. This approach also helped to directly address the essential 
terrorism that the LTTE sought to instill in the hearts of the masses. It was considered 
imperative to address the essential purpose of the insurgencies in order for the SLA to 
overcome the challenge of abolishing the LTTE threat. However, it is important to note 
that the LTTE soon realized the degree to which this strategy was influencing their 
operations and began to realize the necessity of acquiring and holding military control. 
B. MEDIA TRANSPARENCY AND PROPAGANDA 
The media itself failed to realize its role in the initial stages of the conflict. The 
effect of the media was hardly merit able of any significant in the beginning. Any 
measures taken by the government that included force were considered to be nothing less 
than atrocities on the part of the government. In essence, a deficiency in the information 
circulating in the media helped to place the media in a state of ignorance regarding the 
devastations being caused by the LTTE’s actions. In fact, the role of the media was first 
clearly recognized by the LTTE. The LTTE managed to make use of the media to its own 
advantage. The Tamil elements managed to make use of the media during the initial three 
wars. The Tamil Diaspora managed to make use of the Internet to its own advantage. The 
losses were exaggerated and public sentiment was manipulated in an attempt to distort 
reality and facts. 
The role and relevance of the media was unparalleled and the state of affairs was 
worsened by the fact that the media did not manage to support the government in any 
manner. In fact, the media ended up propagating pro-Tamil information; that eventually 
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served the purpose of the Tamil insurgents.124 In essence, the government, its efforts, and 
the rationale behind the government’s efforts were seriously undermined during the 
course of the wars. 
The second and third Eelam wars were given a considerable degree of attention. 
However, the information was highly politicized. The information provided to the general 
public in the second and the third EELAM was regarded as the information as highly 
politicized. Because of the strict censorship on media, there was difficulty for the 
information to be delivered. The information on state data on various regions and number 
of social establishments was ignored from war-torn regions and the divested populace. 
The image, which was showed about the economic and social matters, was very different 
from what is in reality. This resulted in problem of evaluation and assessment done by the 
national and international agencies. The coverage of Pongu Thamil demonstrations and 
LTTE persuaded the student to hold the direct protest on the military camps in the 
regions of North and East. This created immense disarray that the media completely 
ignored.125 The group of people known as the Sri Lanka Working Journalist Association 
(SLWJA) accused many of medical personnel of being at the payroll of LTTE. A leaflet 
was distributed in 2007 signed by Chandragupta Amarasinghe that disclosed this 
information of accusing the media personnel. It also included the biased role of media in 
the efforts of the SLG.  
As a result the media was used as a weapon of LTTE. In this regard, the 
government remained silence and the entire news was produced and covered from the 
end of LTTE. The killings of LLTE were manipulated against the government and were 
regarded as the genocide against the Tamils. This resulted in a great sympathy at the 
international front, in which the France and USA supported the LTTE cause. 
On the other hand, the government remained avoiding the negative converge 
being portrayed. The state of art communication was used as a promotion by LTTE at the 
international and national front. To enhance the LTTE separatist cause, different satellite 
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transmission was built.126 The main aim was to increase and raise funds for the cause 
promoted by the LTTE. Despite of all the facts, the tactic resulted in great success. It was 
surprisingly noted that many of the news agencies showed their sympathy for the LTTE 
cause. The news about the suicide attacks and the employment of women and children 
killers were greatly puffed up. On December 2002, Ranil Wickremesinghe, the prime 
minister of Sri Lanka declared the LTTE had no connections with any terrorist network 
groups including Al Qaeda. 
This news proved to be set back for all the people. This statement of the Prime 
Minister in December 2002 was issued in China. This denying of the link of the LTTE 
with the terrorist networks, framed an entirely different image of LTTE. If the 
comparisons were drawn, this news would have resulted in great Chinese’s support. This 
was because China had already disapproved any armed forced to be given for the favor of 
the U.S. war in Afghanistan.127 This war Afghanistan was against the Al-Qaeda. The 
accepting of the LTTE as being dangerous and destructive group as Al Qaeda would have 
worked in a better way for the SLG cause. 
A considerable role of gathering sympathies for LTTE was played by the national 
movies. The contribution of “Sulanga Enu Pinisa” by Vimukthi Jayasundera to the LTTE 
propaganda can particularly be noted. The movie demonstrated the glorified efforts put in 
by a soldier who fought for the security of his homeland completely scorning the 
government’s efforts in this regards, which extremely demoralized the government. The 
movie was openly critiqued by Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera who was the present 
Director General of the CDF (Civil Defence Force).128 Apart from that, the serving Army 
Chief of Staff, Major General Daya Ratnayake and the Commissioner General of 
Rehabilitation also criticized the ways by which media and some movies had portrayed 
the image of LTTE. The lack of coverage of war efforts and for the government was 
considered to be a positive thing as suggested by critics. Due to the fact that LTTE was 
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the focal point, the government had been successful in keeping its tactics under the hood. 
Moreover, the strategies were kept hidden from everyone as well as the enemy because 
scrutiny and media coverage was avoided. 
Media was transformed into a new era by the government of President Rajapakshe 
after observing all the above-mentioned shortcomings. In order to work in collaboration 
with the national media, the security forces attempted to introduce their propaganda 
wings and media, which resulted in all forms of media including the paper, electronic and 
web to work under a single umbrella providing much information of the current wars 
news. Furthermore, journalists were allowed to join in with the troops by the government 
so that they can report news directly from the battlefield, which turned out to be an 
immensely motivating factor for countrymen towards the war efforts. The government 
also used UAV for the purpose of showing as to how the operations have been 
progressing to international representatives, which was a positive step that was taken by 
the government that presents as to how the soldiers have sacrificed their lives in the 
process of rescuing innocent Tamil people from the custody of LTTE, thus, justifying the 
cause of Humanitarian Operation. However, the efforts to influence Western nations to 
rescue Prabahakaran and other cadres from the front line were continued by the 
sympathetic nations and people, which failed due to steady and strong policies of the 
government against terrorism. 
The cutting of media pipeline was the smartest act of the government. The Tamil 
liberally assumed that the Western media was highly powerful and did not foresee the 
fact that the SLG was willing and capable of doing anything to gain its control. They 
relied on Western media for support of bringing about intervention. 
The spirit that the security forces, eventually, proved to play a vital role and to 
foster public support was represented by the media campaign. The motivational levels of 
soldiers were high as their communities behind them, which was a novel initiative that 
proved decisive in generating motivation and gathering support for people. 
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C. CONCURRENT POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND 
REHABILITATION MECHANISMS 
The process of transformation of developing countries in the 21st century to stable 
nations with democratic system demands careful planning of growth, a long-term and 
strong commitment to the process of nation building, and an intervention force of 
adequate size. This especially seems true in countries where the majority of people are 
divided on the basis of ethnicities and do not share an identical cultural history. Although, 
after complying with all these preconditions, the failure or success of an international 
intervention is basically reliant on both the capability of the intervention forces to set up 
stable and safe environment as well as undertaking of the legitimacy. Armed forces in Sri 
Lanka have assumed the leading role in ensuring internal security, whereas, the police 
force of Sri Lanka have increasingly become materialized. The armed forces of Sri Lanka 
(mainly police and military) have shortened their courses of training and shifted their 
complete focus on crushing any element or potential risk of insurgency. Meanwhile, the 
chiefs of government and security forces utilized all possible options to develop the 
capabilities of their men to actively participate in the reconstruction process after 
conflicts that cause destruction, by knowing the financial problems their country is 
facing. Moreover, the government came up with a plan for a speedy reconstruction and 
rehabilitation process using the security forces of the country. In the past, history 
documents no such initiative by the government to cope with a devastating economy. 
Additionally, the fact has been recognized by the SLG that women, more than 
men, were diversely affected by the war. The issues of women were not only contained to 
the internal displacement, but also cover the livelihoods, war widows, violence based on 
gender and sexuality, among others. Realizing the facts, prominent and renowned women 
were chosen and a committee was established to work for the inclusion of issues related 
to gender in the process of peacemaking, including rehabilitation and reconstruction. The 
term of references of the committee, however, was intentionally left so that they could be 
formed after consultation with members in the first meeting. The efforts of the gender 
committee were acknowledged by everyone, because they began their functions 
effectively not only in the process of peacekeeping but in highlighting the common 
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grounds to strengthen the bond of sisterhood among women on both sides. International 
communities were always given importance by the SLG, which is reflected in involving 
the community in the peacekeeping process since the beginning. This also helped the 
SLG obtain support from the international community in the program of reconstruction.  
The short-term benefit of the ceasefire for the people is that it strengthened the 
process of peacekeeping. The involvement of the international community is inevitable in 
accordance with the nature of the problem. In fact, the problem has become an 
international issue and many countries openly banned the LTTE as political actor, 
including India. There was the effect of the widespread and large Diaspora of Tamil 
population on the authorities of the states they are residing in. There were many countries 
in the world that had developed interest in demanding peace in Sri Lanka, which 
supported the involvement of international communities. The aid that government had 
received after the tsunami played a significant role in stabilizing the financial position of 
the government, which boosted the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction. The 
country suffered from the tsunami when the whole nation was still occupied with 
domestic crisis and civil wars. 
When the affected community begins to move their life towards normalcy, the 
government has given attention on the basis of priority to the resettlement of displaced 
people during the war, rehabilitating and rebuilding the health and educational system 
and demining of the productive agriculture land. With the removal of the economic and 
trade barriers and the opening of the main national highway A9 of North (the highway 
was closed during the war for years to create a division between North and South), aid in 
the rapid economic and social reformation. The opening of the highway not only aid in 
integrating the two divided economies but also helps the government to create the 
environment of the reconciliation and peace among the people of South and North. After 
a long time, once again the Buddhist pilgrims were allowed to worship at the sacred 
locations of the pilgrimage for instance the Nagadipa Island off Jaffna peninsula with no 
impediment.  
Likewise the pilgrims of Tamil community from North were also allowed to 
participate in the national level events and visit their sacred place in South like Kovil of 
 72
Kataragama. SLG established the highly desirable and needed mechanisms of institutions 
i.e. two Peace Secretariats. One secretariat represents the government side whereas other 
is utilized by LTTE for establishing contacts between both sides. The secretariats also 
offer their support to both parties both in term of logistic and substantive manner. A 
Muslim Peace Secretariat was also established by the SLG. The sub-committees of both 
sides actively worked on the issue of concerns like de-escalation of issues related to 
gender and assessing and providing the need for rehabilitation via coordinated efforts 
from both sides.  
Though, the Eelam war IV has adversely affected the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction process, however, the government has maintain her efforts for peace 
keeping, which substantially aid in rehabilitating internally displaced people, during 
humanitarian organization. LTTE started to function as more of a conventional force in 
opposition to SLA, than as an insurgence unit using asymmetrical tactics. Contrasting to 
the actual objectives and goals, insurgent has started to focus more on developing kinetics 
and conventional capacity. David Galula in Counterinsurgency Warfare has 
comprehensively addressed this phenomenon: Theory and Practice. Galula in his book 
explains the decreasing importance of the cause of insurgency. 
The cause that forms the foundation of a movement is a critically important 
element. It forms the fundamental building block on which the insurgency assisting the 
movement is based. However, the importance of the cause experiences a decline as the 
power of the insurgency continues to increase with the passage of time. At one point, the 
cause is forgotten and sidelined, leaving behind the singular purpose of winning the war. 
As a direct result, the population begins to take sides that tend to be based on the degree 
to which the population perceives the two sides. 
The political capacity was seriously undermined by the presence of the LTTE’s 
kinetic abilities. As a result, the support for the LTTE began to experience a significant 
deterioration. As a result, Eelam IV became a turning point; particularly when perceived 
within the frame of reference of events that took place from 2006 to 2009. Lionel 
Beehner’s perspective on the usage of COIN by Sri Lanka at this point in time is of 
significant relevance. The perspective holds that the LTTE had the advantage of a 
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complete military wing that constituted ground, air, and sea forces. The LTTE had as 
many as 20,000 conscripts who were not only trained but also heavily trained. The 
purchase of equipment such as GPRS systems helped the Tigers become proficient in 
conventional warfare as well as in the area of guerilla warfare. The Sri Lankan army 
always seemed to be one step behind the LTTE.129 
Summarily, the government managed to make use of the media when they finally 
managed to depict the soldiers on the front lines as heroes of the nation. This allowed the 
government to portray Tamil actions as atrocities that needed to be brought to a stop. The 
government began slowly at first, and then accelerated its usage of the media as a weapon 
in the war. This turned the tables on the LTTE. This allowed the SLG to regain the 
support that it had desperately needed during the initial course of the war. The 
reconstruction program was greatly strengthened as a result of this strategy. 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF EELAM WAR IV STRATEGIES AND COIN 
PRINCIPLES 
The counterinsurgency philosophy discusses the basic measures, which can be 
adopted to win the counterinsurgency war. However, during the insurgent rule of the 
Tamil Tigers, certain counterinsurgency strategies of the Sri Lankan government have not 
yet been written or discussed in detail so far. Therefore, these counterinsurgency 
strategies are regarded as newly formulated tactics or strategies which were implemented 
to win the Sri Lankan war of Eelam. 
A lot of effort has been invested in the intelligence aspect of counterinsurgency 
principles, which is a clear indication of its importance.130 However, while military 
forces have needed to work out intelligence networks, insurgent organizations need fewer 
or no third- party or technology assistance, and so have direct access to all intelligence 
aspects.131 However, regarding real-time human intelligence (HUMINT), many believe 
that it paves the way to the success of humanitarian operations.   
Basically, the reason behind the insurgency in the Sri Lankan northern and eastern 
regions was due to the ethnic discrimination of Tamil civilians over the years. Sri Lankan 
government, which was primarily dominated by the Sinhalese, carried on its ethno-
nationalist discrimination and racially prejudiced policies towards the Tamil minority. 
The country of Sri Lanka is largely comprised of two competing ethnic populations, 
Sinhalese and Tamil. Both these populations derive their cultural roots from the greater 
Indian sub-continent. However, over the past several centuries, these ethnicities have 
grown to develop their own societal norms and values. 
Beginning in the seventeenth century, Western powers from Europe began to 
influence the area through trading and the establishment of schools and missions. 
Eventually, the British Empire formally colonized the island in the 19th century. While 
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still under control of the British Empire, the Tamil minority was at times 
disproportionately over-represented in the colonial administrative government along with 
the Christian/Westernized Sinhalese elite. 
Within Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese population is the largest group. The majority of 
the Sri Lankan Sinhalese lives in the southern and western portions of the island. Of 
particular importance to Sinhalese Sri Lankans is their Buddhist tradition. In the decades 
following independence from Great Britain, the mobilization of Sinhalese citizens 
through social structures within the Buddhist faith played a central role in the eventual 
marginalization of Sri Lankan Tamils, leading to radicalization and militarization of 
Tamil groups. The Sri Lankan Tamil people represent approximately 13 percent of the 
population. Members of this ethnic group reside mainly in the northern and eastern 
portions of the country. However, there is a small Sri Lankan Tamil community with 
large business holdings in Colombo.  
Since a large part of the Sri Lankan population was Sinhalese, therefore, soon 
after the Sri Lankan independence in the year 1948, they immediately controlled 
country’s authority. After taking control of the country’s power they launched a number 
of laws, which provoked ethnic discrimination. These laws were formulated to benefit the 
Sinhalese majority and completely excluded the Tamil and other ethnic minorities. 
During the seventies, after struggling for years of social and political turmoil and conflict, 
the Tamil civilians became frustrated by these discriminating behaviours of Sinhalese and 
formed both legal as well as illegal movements for resisting Sinhalese power. The 
seventies had very limited amount of violent riots, however, in the eighties the violent 
riots were escalated by the Tamil resistance which were aimed against the Sri Lankan 
Sinhalese government.  
In July of 1983, these small but violent riots late became fully blown guerrilla 
war. The Tamil rebels, who were brought under one umbrella of the Liberation Tamil 
Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, murdered 13 Sinhalese military 
and armed officers, the Tamil region of Jaffna. The largest and most damaging riot came 
in 1983, which signalled not only the apex of anti-Tamil ethnic violence to date, but 
radicalized many Tamils against the Sri Lankan state. This event sparked many violent 
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riots, which spread throughout the country and caused created two antagonistic groups 
within the nation. Most accounts describe the riots as a Sinhalese reaction to the death of 
13 Sri Lankan soldiers, who were killed in an ambush in northern Sri Lanka by the 
fledgling Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). From July 24 to August 5, Sinhalese 
mobs attacked and destroyed Tamil businesses, killed Tamils and burned homes. The 
reported death toll varies widely dependent upon the source, with numbers anywhere 
from 350–2000 killed.132 The after effects of the riots were also devastating.133 The 
number of refugees was estimated at 79,000 to 80,000. The formation of camps to house 
the refugees created long-term suffering as these Tamils had nowhere to turn because 
their entire livelihoods had been destroyed. This marked the beginning of LTTE’s aim of 
overthrowing government and gain independence in northeast of Sri Lanka. A 
charismatic leader, what many of his devoted followers called, Velupillai Prabhakarn, led 
the Tamil Tigers. The Tamil Tigers used far-spreading terrorism and used guerrilla war 
strategies against the public as well as the targeted government officials. This resulted in 
gory riots for two decades (i.e., throughout the eighties and the nineties). The government 
of Sri Lanka involved international communities to in order to overpower the rising 
LTTE insurgency.  In the later years of the nineties, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government agreed on a temporary ceasefire. Due to this agreement, there was an 
unconvincing cessation of hostilities for almost six years. However, in the spring of 2006, 
violent riots again erupted when the Tamil Tigers carried out a suicidal attack on the 
Army Headquarters, which was situation in the Sri Lankan capital Colombo.  
When President Rajapaksa took over in the year 2005, he promised to create a 
rejoiced nation with no sign of the Tamil Tigers,134 which echoed with the voices of the 
devastated nation. Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa, after coming into power in 2005, 
attempted to transform the features of the government and leadership entirely and 
employed the similar guerrilla warfare strategies that were adopted by the Tamil Tigers in 
the previous three wars of Eelam. The government also attempted to employ the 
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strategies, which the Tamil Tigers were using through the prolonged war, which resulted 
in violent streaks, along with militant propaganda, and innovative guerrilla warfare 
strategies.135 
In the year 2009, Sri Lankan government was able to militarily defeat Tamil 
insurgent forces, known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Despite the fact 
that Sri Lanka is a developing nation, the insurgents maintained this war through 
resources that came to a large extent from external sources. In May of 2009, after a two-
and-a-half year military offensive, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces surrounded the last of 
the insurgents. The LTTE was once a unit of over 10,000 battle-hardened guerrillas. 
However, the remnants that attempted this act of desperation consisted of many 
conscripted young children, who held civilians as human shields. Meanwhile, their core 
leadership made desperate calls from their makeshift bunkers for American or British 
protection upon surrender. Arguably, they were only a shell of what was once considered 
to be one of the most feared insurgent movements of the modem age. This last stand 
resulted in the death and capture of the last of the holdouts. As proof of the insurgency’s 
demise, a photo of LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran was released, with a bullet hole 
in his forehead. Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the head of the LTTE’s international diplomatic 
relations committee, released the following statement: “we have already announced to the 
world our position to silence our guns to save our people.”136 With that statement, the 
Tamil Tigers admitted to a military defeat and the longest running war in South Asia 
came to an end after 25 years of gruesome devastation. 
Since uprisings almost surely will continue to pose significant domestic and 
foreign policy challenges, counterinsurgency strategies are politically activated 
campaigns, which exploits all the elements of the country in order to eradicate the 
insurgent group.137 Although, combating insurgent groups require military resources to 
counteract, however, certain non-military resources should also be used to 
counterbalance. These non-military strategies include re-establishing the local authority, 
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reforming economy or development of infrastructure.138 Although, combating insurgent 
groups through military resources is more direct, certain non-military resources focus on 
the civilians so that the country’s legitimacy can be enhanced and the support for the 
insurgent groups can be reduced.139 The insurgent groups and the counterinsurgency 
strategies combat in order to win the hearts and minds of the civilians.  
A. WINNING COIN STRATEGIES: THE SRI LANKA SCENARIO 
The response of a government to domestic challenges has a major impact on the 
span and result of the insurgency war. The counterinsurgency publication explains that 
the current counterinsurgency guidelines, principles and strategies were actually based on 
the three decade old British experiences. It included political dominance, political 
objective, synchronized government and administration, intelligence services, separation 
of support for insurgent groups, counterbalancing the insurgent groups and long run 
planning for post insurgency. As the country’s administration counterbalances the rising 
insurgency on their land, they also have to undergo strategic decision making in order to 
implement strategic counterinsurgency measures. It is a common logic that these 
rebellious uprisings can be easily eradicated when they are in their initial stages. As these 
insurgencies develop in numbers and their capacity to wreak havoc increase, it becomes 
difficult for the government to eradicate. Using the case of Sri Lankan insurgency and the 
measures that the government adopted to eradicate them, other states can also implement 
those strategies to eradicate the insurgent forces when they are in their budding phases. 
Eradicating the insurgency when they are budding is also crucial for the global war 
against terrorism. After considering many challenges on global war against insurgency 
and Sri Lankan case study, the writer has extracted following strategies which can be 
used to counterbalance the rising insurgent groups. 
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B. GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY 
According to the model Manwaring, which is the most vital aspect, explains the 
success and failure of counter-insurgency. Legitimacy of state increases and maintains 
support of the nation in the fight against the insurgency. They undermine the legitimacy 
of the state, and reduce the confidence and credibility of the public. However, general 
phenomena is governments must put all possible efforts to enhance legitimacy among the 
countrymen. These procedures include the Government to take efficient measures to 
provide safety and effective authority to meet the resident’s basic desires. The four 
prolonged wars of Eelam, which were fought between the Sri Lankan government and its 
rivalry evidence that in situations like these the government should deploy the best 
counterinsurgency measures to defeat the insurgent rebels. The first three wars of Eelam 
were not successful because the Sri Lankan government failed to bring down the rising 
insurgency of the Tamil Tigers. All the previous three wars ended with peace talks 
between the government and the insurgent groups. Since these peace negotiations were 
not successful, they resulted in a subsequent war. The fourth and final war of Eelam was 
successfully turned around the situation when the Sri Lankan government deployed the 
counterinsurgency strategies to its full capacity. Although, combating insurgent groups 
require military resources to counteract, however, certain non-military resources should 
also be used to counterbalance. These non-military strategies include re-establishing the 
local authority, reforming economy or development of infrastructure.140 Although, 
combating insurgent groups through military resources is more direct, certain non-
military resources focus on the civilians so that the country’s legitimacy can be enhanced 
and the support for the insurgent groups can be reduced.141 The insurgent groups and the 
counterinsurgency strategies combat in order to win the hearts and minds of the civilians. 
C. UNITY OF EFFORT  
Counter-insurgency involves a unified effort and movement combine military and 
political measures, as well as social, and economic, and aims for a general goal for all 
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levels. This involves civilian and military harmony, and the aim of resolving the conflict 
to the synchronization of the causes of the insurgency. Explicit attention is given on 
efforts to lead the country to combat the insurgency. Those actions are reviewed, which 
appear conflicting in the strategic objectives of the government. 
The root cause of Sri Lankan government’s action to overturn the stands and alter 
the outlook of war, was because of the lessons learned from the past mistakes and 
stupidity. The government from the previous three wars, and a careful analysis of 
psychological warfare, military equipment and tactics learned profound lessons. In 
winning over the LTTE, the Army adopted the warfare strategy mastered by the LTTE, 
and started using those to supplement its major manoeuvre operations against the attacks 
carried out by LTTE who were also later became to use conventional strategy. The 
government also attempted to employ the strategies that the Tamil Tigers were using 
through the prolonged war, which resulted in violent streaks, along with militant 
propaganda and innovative guerrilla warfare strategies. The Sri Lankan government 
primarily focused on strategies to bring the entire nation under one umbrella by utilising 
the strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the nation and defeat the Tamil 
insurgency as a united nation. The Sri Lankan army further incorporated effective and 
strategic operations to counteract the threats that were posed by the Tamil Tigers.142 Due 
to this, the Tamil Tigers had to rethink the strategies they need to adopt; they chose the 
traditional rebel strategies, which was in complete contrast to their more conventional 
strategies. In general, the entire counterinsurgency strategy of Sri Lankan government 
was to overwhelm the Tamil Tigers with the combined impact of both conventional as 
well as guerrilla combat strategies. Massive coordinated missile attacks were also 
launched effectively to target the Tamil Tigers. The main reason behind the success was 
President Rajapaksa’s motive that professionals to lead the war with no interferences. 
During these successful operations the Tamil Tigers were defeated because they did not 
anticipate the strength of the superior opponent and did not revise their strategies. They 
also did not anticipate the new tactics and strategies that were adopted by the armed 
forces of Sri Lanka.  
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D. POLITICAL PRIMACY IN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
Root causes, the politics should sustain prevalence countering insurgency 
operation. As military campaigns are mandatorily required to fight with vicious acts 
conducted by rebel troops, the overall strategic plan should not overlook the country’s 
legitimacy. According to U.S. Army Field Manual 3–24, “resolving most insurgencies 
requires a political solution; it is thus imperative that counterinsurgent actions do not 
hinder achieving that political solution.” 
Government’s policies processes are reassessed to find out the effect of designed 
operations are fulfilling major political aims. Such a military campaign that does not 
appear to be promising shows that political primacy has been overlooked in making the 
state counterinsurgency strategy. 
The military and political leadership played the best role out of the COIN 
principles for the government in winning the war. The political objectives were clearly 
set in the period from 2006–2009. The government constantly presented apparent aims to 
the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and provided a full support to their mission from the start 
to end, in every aspect. Despite of the absence of well-built LTTE leadership in the East, 
the combatants went on fighting like a conservative force instead of a rebellious group—
a major strategic blunder as the Tamil Tigers no longer had enough force to take on a 
usual battle.143 
At the time when Mahinda Rajapksa came up as the head of state in November 
2005, the LTTE had a control on large parts of region in the northern areas. As any 
terrorist orgernization, LTTE also enhanced and maintained their fighting strength, 
combat power, capabilities and success, which truly affected to change the political will 
of the country to resource the armed forces. Ironically, the operational and tactical 
victories of Prabhakaran helped reserve the SLAF reaction to 26 years of hostility. 144 
This new political trend let the brothers Rajapksa to shift to latest, more expensive forms 
of war that consisted more of advance technology cum RMAs I, II and III. In comparison, 
                                                 
143 O’Balance, The Cyanide War, 11–26. 
144 Schneier, Beyond Fear, 12–99. 
 83
the attraction of a separate country, together with its associated conservative force 
arrangement, proved very much off-putting for Prabhakaran in the end. Instead of 
relapsing to an RMA-II, Maoist stance, LTTE made efforts to hold territory against a 
greater SLAF.145  
E. SECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 
Livelihood safety is the major constituent of defeating the insurgency that 
improves state authenticity and averts development of rebels’ existence. Victorious 
measures executed under the law and order guarantee human rights, achieve admired 
support for the government and restrict the insurgent field of pressure. The contemplation 
of rights abuses is examined. Suppressive approaches, draconian safety rules, and 
inhabitant wrongdoings point out to a collapse in ensuring efficient livelihood security.  
Island nation has made vociferous progress in the fields of direct humanitarian aid 
to IDPs, rehabilitation and demining of infrastructure, relocation of IDPs, rehabilitation 
of ex-combatants, converting a combating force to state developers, development of 
livelihood, refurbishment of security situation and autonomous establishments and plans 
of continuing economic growth schemes. The improvement is attained under complex 
and difficult setting and with inadequate facilities on hand.  
In Sri Lanka the “Triple R” program, which stands for Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Reconciliation, had been widely conversed among the citizens during the former 
government, was commenced in the regions of the east and north and in the four 
neighbouring regions that had also been under the effect of the conflict.  
F. EXTENT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE STATE 
Support from external players may be in several forms that include financial 
assistance, advisor support, direct armed forces intrusion. The government in need may 
be given this support through associated governments, bordering states, the UN, or non-
state agencies that are experts in handling conflicts. The incidence and nature of external 
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support is assessed in each scenario. External support is carefully assessed to find out its 
level of usefulness in recuperating state counterinsurgency competence.  
Great external support from Pakistan, China, India and reasonable support from 
other Western states also obtained due to those strategies even government had to bear 
significant pressure as a result of numerous accusations constructed by the Tamil 
Diaspora.146 Besides the support of war on terrorism by United States, gaining worldwide 
support was a clever move as well. As the SLG managed to obtain support of Russia and 
China, two enduring affiliates of the Security Council and preserving of Indo-Lanka 
relation, in the proper manner to Sri Lankan government, approached on crushing 
country’s terrorism. This proved to be a very tactical role in preventing and opposing 
Western pressures. “In early [months] of 2006, the Sri Lanka Defense Ministry, led by 
President Rajapaksa’s brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, and the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), 
[initiated offensives] against the LTTE.”147 
Throughout the former battles, India had always intervened with the armed 
struggles claiming that east/north Tamil population were pestered and effected by the 
actions of forces, but in the Eelam War IV, India sustained a helpful part. This was a 
splendid success of the political headship. Ministry of Defense constantly informed 
Indian authorities with the occurring operational circumstances, which facilitated to 
develop a good military and political relationship between the two states. 
G. ABILITY TO REDUCE EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE INSURGENT 
Insurgent troops look for outside support to acquire material, diplomatic, and 
political programme in promoting their cause. Insurgent troops may obtain favours from 
both non-state and state players concerned to the cause of the insurgents. The existence 
and level of outside support to the insurgent is regarded. Government’s remedies to fight 
with outside support are reviewed as an element in diminishing insurgent potential. 
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Indian Premiere Gandhi emerged as considerate to the Tamil root and proposed 
India’s willingness of arbitration headed for a political resolution. In July 1987, Sri Lanka 
and India signed Indo-Lanka Accord with the aim of attaining harmony between the Sri 
Lankan Government and LTTE. The agreement laid down the acknowledgment of the 
Northeast as historical territories of the Tamil natives. This contentious recognition 
brought in aggressive oppositions by the civilians of Sinhalese. 
To fight with a rising threat, the President Jayawardena pleased military aid from 
the neighbour India. From 1988 to 1990, Indian military, in the name of IPKF held the 
North and East, Tamil pre-dominancy of Sri Lanka. And they carried out operations 
against insurgents.  
H. COUNTERINSURGENCY PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION IN 
SRI LANKA  
A clear indication of the importance of the intelligence facet of counterinsurgency 
principals is the volume of efforts invested in it.148 Almost all of the internal and external 
legal security forces need to develop intelligence plans, either using technology or 
through third the assistance of various third parties. In contrast, insurgency groups do not 
need to rely on technology or third parties and therefore have direct access to all aspects 
of the current intelligence.149 When it comes to human intelligence, many see real time 
human intelligence (HUMINT) as integral to the success of humanitarian operations. In 
my opinion, all external forces see HUMINT as a major drawback. This is due to the 
reluctance of these forces in employment of the native forces for this purpose. Mainly 
this is due to both the absence of confidence and lack of support from the local 
population. In counter insurgency intelligence operations, the role of technology is 
crucial. Both lawfully authorized forces and insurgents make the most of the available 
technological systems, often freely available in the region.150 The limitations of the 
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technology come to forefront when selection for the systems appropriate for the 
operations is concerned. The systems must be viable both operationally and financially 
and must prove efficient and profitable while in use during the operations. Affordability 
is a key factor for any country that is looking to use it in any counterinsurgency effort. 
As per my research, a concentrated use of media and propaganda has not been 
employed as a main factor by any nation,151 but there have been cases of its use for 
winning the populace. This proved to be a major factor in the Sri Lankan War. Both 
printed and electronic media can play a pivotal task in the progress of any engagement, 
battle and campaign. Any campaign, battle of engagement can benefit from the role of 
media and propaganda. Thus, the appropriate transfer of information (real time works 
best) to the people of the world is a must for success. This also has the advantage of 
negating or damping out the workings and capabilities of the terrorist media and its 
propaganda. This is a critical factor for success for any media campaign. Another aspect 
of this real time transfer of news is that it allows government’s campaign to follow its 
course without outside interference. Indeed, as the experience has shown, it can prove to 
be a source of positive support for the operations. To win a war, proper cooperation and 
coordination of the entire government machinery and all the political agencies is 
required.152 Although this point is known and understood by many in the field, past 
narrative does not present convincing evidence that this principle has been used or 
employed with success. Most of the campaigns fought by external armies have faced 
adequate problems with joined efforts, since coalition forces used to adhere and fallow 
completely diverse strategies, instructions and ideologies within the common purpose.153 
Similar set of circumstances were noticed even with domestic forces when bearing in 
mind elements in support of the background work. Additionally, there was no substantial 
verification throughout the review of literature, which suggests that any coalition, agency 
or country, had developed successful post conflict methods that forms a part of any 
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counterinsurgency plan. However, it was in post-conflict plan for the employment of the 
fourth stage of the process in Sri Lanka, and illustrates the importance of political 
stability, and wins the battle.154 The approach of Sri Lankan authorities in Eelam War IV 
has drawn the anger of considerable concerns of international society.155 The 
international nations, Western in particular, have not shown any concern for the causes of 
the Sri Lankan government.  
All the time, the Sri Lankan government opted to continue chasing the military 
strategy for eradicating the Tamil Tigers, using standard operating procedures. 
Furthermore, the Sri Lankan government also faced defeat in expanding its tactics 
beyond the military strategies and developing international socioeconomic and political 
elements of counterbalancing the insurgent attacks. For instance, the government of Sri 
Lanka failed to provide a reasonable and alternative direction to the Tamil community, 
who were in the middle of the war between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan 
government and suffered the most. The government of Sri Lanka also failed to take 
drastic measures to ease the distress of the Tamil community in the two provinces the 
North and the East regions. Additionally, the speed at which the counterinsurgency 
strategies were executed was quite slow and insufficient to counterbalance the ever-
increasing international and local threat by the Tamil Tigers. The Armed and Military 
forces of Sri Lanka deployed a combined RMA strategy, which included RMA I, RMA 
III and RMA IV. The war inclined more towards the guerrilla methods of warfare in 
order to counterbalance the combined RMA strategies of the Tamil Tigers. The Sri 
Lankan army further incorporated effective and strategic operations to counteract the 
threats, which were posed by the Tamil Tigers. Due to this, the Tamil Tigers had to 
rethink the strategies they need to adopt; they chose the traditional rebel strategies, which 
was in complete contrast to their more conventional strategies. Although Sri Lankan 
troops “morale was still high, it prompted the Government of Sri Lanka and Sri Lankan 
military to show great interest in maintaining the morale and pride of the soldiers since 
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the diverse situation of the Vietnam war, which has been a very non-traditional war. Two 
different methods were employed: materialistic, and non- materialistic.156 First, the 
government of Sri Lanka decided on the materialistic factors to sustain the morale of the 
soldiers by increasing the payment and reimbursements. Second, the leaders of the 
government of Sri Lanka focused on the non- materialistic factors to sustain the morale 
and pride of the soldiers. Government of Sri Lanka began to realize that it will take more 
hard work, and participation in the conduct of calculated guerrilla warfare. “They urged 
Korean soldiers to take pride in them about their missions and recognise themselves as 
‘freedom crusaders,’ not ‘mercenaries.’”157  
The COIN military forces comprised of very experienced, sophisticated and well 
trained officers who had the ability to operate separately for a little time. These soldiers 
can be pushed into the forests in the beginning of the battle. Commandos and special 
military forces can be sent after them for support to catch Tamil tiger off guard and defeat 
them.158 These restructuring made “Sri Lankan army that [eradicate] the LTTE out of the 
eastern, then northern province.”159 First, centralisation under one command, and 
decentralisation based on SIOT, functioned as the flexible organisation. The Sri Lankan 
army further incorporated effective and strategic operations to counteract the threats, 
which were posed by the Tamil Tigers. Due to this, the Tamil Tigers had to rethink the 
strategies they needed to adopt; they chose the traditional rebel strategies, which was in 
complete contrast to their more conventional strategies.  
However, when Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa took power in 2005, the Tamil 
Tigers were able to capture vast territories in the northern regions of Killinochchi, 
Mullaithivu, and a few areas of Mannar. LTTE had no problem finding recruits, as many 
Tamils who did not flee with the Diaspora volunteered after witnessing the atrocities 
committed against them. With notable exceptions, a combination of LTTE 
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“salesmanship,” coupled with the geographic separation of the Diaspora from everyday 
events in northern Sri Lanka, has allowed this perception largely to remain within the 
Diaspora, facilitating the continual flow of funding and political support.  The decision of 
Prabhakaran to hold strategically significant territories proved to be the reason for the 
demise of the Tamil Tigers. The Armed and Military forces of Sri Lanka deployed a 
combined RMA strategy, which included RMA I, RMA III and RMA IV. The war 
inclined more towards the guerrilla methods of warfare in order to counterbalance the 
combined RMA strategies of the Tamil Tigers. In contrast, the lure of Tamil native soil 
Eelam, side by side with the traditional power structure associated, distracted 
Prabhakaran too much. Instead of returning to the RMA-II, and the Maoist situation, 
Prabhakaran LTTE tried to grasp ground against the supreme Sri Lankan Armed Forces. 
Thus, reducing size, and not the region was the goal of Rajapksa, the Sri Lankan 
President, which seemed to not reach a conformity, was far from attractive for the nation. 
Later, flaws in the shield of the Tamil Tigers began to appear. 160 This was not so much 
as a result of the LTTE’s early transformation to Mao’s Phase III, but because during 
successful operations by the Sri Lankan government, the Tamil Tigers were defeated 
because they did not anticipate the strength of their superior opponent and did not revise 
their strategies. They also did not anticipate the new tactics and strategies that were 
adopted by the military and armed forces of Sri Lanka. Prabhakaran underestimated the 
strength of Sri Lanka’s armed forces fully capable of RMA I, RMA III, and RMA IV 
strategies and opted to capture strategically significant regions. Brilliant counteracting 
techniques will always defeat flawed strategies. Prabhakaran failed to anticipate the 
strength of the superior opponent forces. He did not formulate a defensive strategy and a 
support strategy, which the militant or rebel forces required during the insurgency 
movements. The Armed and Military forces of Sri Lanka deployed a combined RMA 
strategy, which included RMA I, RMA III, and RMA IV. The war inclined more towards 
the guerrilla methods of warfare in order to counterbalance the combined RMA strategies 
of the Tamil Tigers.   
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Finally, the counterinsurgency philosophy discusses the basic measures which can 
be adopted to win the counterinsurgency war. However, during the insurgent rule of the 
Tamil Tigers, certain counterinsurgency strategies of the Sri Lankan government have not 
yet been written or discussed in detail so far. Therefore, these counterinsurgency 
strategies are regarded as newly formulated tactics or strategies, which were implemented 
to win the Sri Lankan war of Eelam. Some of the strategies of the regime were concerned 
with gaining the support of the people and winning their hearts.  However, while this 
tactic contributed to the success of the fourth phase of the Sri Lankan campaign, it was 
overlooked in the literature as one of the principles of improved counterinsurgency 
techniques employed by Sri Lanka. The study analyses how the learned lessons were 
expedited efficiently and were utilized during subsequent wars. Most of the publications 
saw that after formulating counterinsurgency fundamentals, no in-depth study has been 
carried out to re-draft the policies to make them pertinent to contemporary 
insurgencys.161 The reshaping of any principle should be universal, allowing its 
application to be relevant to the scenario of any internal conflict. At present, existing 
strategies and countermeasures are either out dated, or are something completely new, or 
are polished from combat to combat but are not solid.162 Hence it is important to analyse 
and find the suitability of those principles for contemporary internal engagement. 
The study explains that counterinsurgency experts and theorists alike have to be 
careful when setting up processes and approaches. They might hold onto the key aim of 
population-centric counterinsurgency and the gaining of the insurgent population’s 
support and sympathies, but they should not rigidly restrict the way they attain the goal of 
population-centric tactics and operations. As a result, these understandings garnered from 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The brutality, never ending hostility, and mass devastation conducted by the 
Tamil Tigers disrupted the rulers—and the entire Sri Lankan nation—to the core. This 
study attempts to understand how the Sri Lankan approach changed after numerous long 
wars (which each concluded with the government's whitewash) and was finally able to 
succeed.  The insurgency war lasted for almost 25 years in Sri Lanka. After all these 
years of targeted attacks, suicide terror campaigns, bombings, and murder attempts on 
civilians, high profile government officials, and famous people, the military and armed 
forces of Sri Lanka were finally successful in eradicating the insurgent Tamil Tigers from 
the country in the year 2009.163 Ever since Sri Lanka succeeded in defeating the Tamil 
Tigers using revised counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies, experts are attempting to 
identify the method, which the Sri Lankan government adopted to successfully eradicate 
the domestic conflict. The success of the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy adopted by 
Sri Lanka is a result of mixed strategies such as government legitimacy, external support 
of governments, unity of effort, competency of reducing external support to the militant 
groups, intelligence, and brave and capable military forces. A mixture of key issues, 
including legitimacy, unity of effort, external support, the ability to reduce outside aid to 
the terrorists, intelligence, media and propaganda, and capable military—these are the 
answers for my first two questions—and purposes of—this research: what enabled Sri 
Lanka to succeed in Elam War IV, and what were the critical differences from the three 
previous phases? Finally, I believe that existing COIN principles, strategies, and 
doctrines need to be reassessed as suitable to the contemporary environment of the 
conflict, as well as on the basis of internal or external factors. However, the process of 
examining past counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies to analyse the major elements which 
helped in explaining the failure or victory of the counterinsurgency (COIN) principles is 
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vital, and it is also crucial to extract the key lessons learned during the past domestic 
conflicts to devise more effective future strategies for counterinsurgency. This may be a 
task for future research. 
According to my early research, no country has so far focused on employment of 
propaganda and media as a major aspect, but some have used it as a part of the standard 
of conquering the minds and hearts of the nation. Throughout the Sri Lankan war, this 
method was used as the key feature. 
Rebels exploit ferocity to achieve political objectives through armed struggle.  
“States must devise counterinsurgency strategy based on legitimacy, effective security, 
and attention to the economic, social, and political causes of insurgent actions.”164 
Without these components, governments are destined to experience a lengthy internal 
war. At the operational level, governments must introduce effective tools such as civilian 
auxiliaries that enhance, and not harm, state legitimacy. The accountability of counter-
insurgent forces is a crucial task, which provides for reviewing these declarations on a 
regular basis.  Keeping in mind the elements of security—political harmony, good 
governance, reforms in economy and civil development—as a whole, the state should 
devise effective measures to reinforce political objectives with the mission to formulate 
counter-insurgent actions side by side.165 The tangible and measurable results of such 
actions would guarantee the state’s capability to counteract the insurgencies prevalent in 
its economy, and weaken the support bases of prominent internal movements. The 
attempt to develop counter-insurgency acts starts with the development of a plan that is 
conveyed across different channels and parties of the state. These plans must integrate all 
the political and military officials who can produce collective outcomes on the success of 
counter-insurgent plans.166 A consistent counter-insurgency plan guarantees sound 
counter-insurgency decisions in the future, provided that it is formulated with clinical 
precision and expertise. The government agencies and other officials of the state must 
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also understand the fact that counter-insurgency does not happen overnight; it requires 
relentless efforts over a longer period of time. This understanding is more important 
within the presidential sector where each individual undertakes different methods and 
strategies for conflict resolutions. Presidential administrations need to develop an 
understanding that such efforts will not prove futile, provided they are long-term and 
tested for their competencies. 
A government’s counterterrorism effort should be able to sustain pressure on the 
terrorists through nonstop tri-forces and police operations executed within a wider 
political strategy. It is very crucial to devise mechanisms that measure and hold the 
political strategy’s alignment with military operations under accountability for 
continuous progress to counter-act insurgencies. In addition to developing a sound 
military force, it is also imperative to devise forces that support human rights protection 
within the state. If the state engages itself in tyrannical attempts in its military operations; 
it would validate the insurgent actions and violate the objective of a peaceful resolution 
of political and social conflicts that may arise.  
As negotiations play a vital role in the overall strategy, policy makers must 
regularly monitor and balance military offensives with diplomatic support. New 
strategies were developed focusing on diplomacy, strategic, tactical and operational 
maneuvers, intelligence, use of technology, media and propaganda, political aim and will, 
gaining population support, humanitarian aspects, along with other strategies. The “role 
of diplomacy and negotiation requires further study as a state counterinsurgency tool.”167  
Negotiations play an important role in resolving internal conflicts while 
maintaining the interests of both the parties at the same time. Insurgent leadership ends 
faster as a result of an effective resolution to domestic struggles than by other means, 
provided it is followed by considerate and sincere discussions with thoughtfulness for 
each other’s interests. According to Bard O’Neil, if the authorities misidentified the 
nature of insurgency that is penetrative in the state, it can deviate from adopting a cost-
effective method to shun insurgencies, and hence, resort to costly means. It is better to 
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study each situation in a comprehensive manner, and customize the response in a rational 
and tactful manner. While O’Neil’s statement is primarily based on gaining wider support 
for a cause, it also holds true for winning the game in negotiations. 
The works of Bard O’Neill and David Galula were amongst the most prominent 
and famous works regarding counterinsurgency that do not put a focus on this crucial tool 
of counter-insurgency. However, the most widely used and popular works have given a 
lot of stress to the non-military measures of counterinsurgency—through the approach of 
winning minds and hearts—and have always stressed that dialogues with the insurgents 
have to be regarded as a crucial part of these measures, which could be described as non-
military.168 Scholars and practitioners who have worked on the topic of 
counterinsurgency have always viewed the tool of dialogues as a sensible way to end 
conflict regarding insurgency. However, the best exercises, lessons learned, and desirable 
conditions for conducting successful dialogues have to be analyzed. 
This examination could be described as a step in the correct direction; however, 
this only commences to search the dynamics of dialogues within the conflicts of 
insurgents and counterinsurgents. The government of Sri Lanka has to enforce reforms to 
earn the faith and belief of the Tamil population in the country. Mahinda Rajapaksa, the 
President of Sri Lanka, made a proclamation of victory over the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam on 19 May 2009. However, this does not lesson the significance of the 
cease of the conflict of the Tamils.  
Although the insurgency of Tamil might have been made torpid in the short run, 
with no attention to the major phenomenon responsible for the conflict, the prospects for 
peace in the long-term for violence would not be there. While the approach of the 
military proved to be astoundingly efficient in the destruction of leaders and supporters of 
the LTTE, the Government of Sri Lanka have to engage in a political solution, in the 
long-term, in order to soothe the country and improve the legitimacy of the 
government.169 Settlement with the Tamils has to happen with the commencement with 
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degeneration of power to regions, which are dominated by Tamil populations, in the 
eastern and northern Provinces in Sri Lanka. The basic rights of the Tamil people, with 
promised ethnic identity and autonomy could be described as the only possible means 
which could be used to preserve peace in the country.170 Sri Lanka, a supposedly 
democratic nation, will have to deliver the democratic rights to the Tamil and other 
minorities in the country. Without enforcing reform measures of political, economic, and 
social issues to deal with the grudges of the Tamil people, withdrawal of security forces 
from these provinces would be inappropriate.  
Basically, the reason behind the insurgency in the Sri Lankan northern and eastern 
regions was due to the ethnic discrimination of Tamil civilians over the years. However, 
over the past several centuries, these ethnicities have grown to develop their own societal 
norms and values. The Sri Lankan Tamil people represent approximately 13 percent of 
the population. Members of this ethnic group reside mainly in the northern and eastern 
region of Sri Lanka. However, there is a small Sri Lankan Tamil community with large 
business holdings in Colombo. Since a large part of the Sri Lankan population was 
Sinhalese, therefore, soon after the Sri Lankan independence in the year 1948, they 
immediately controlled country’s authority. After taking control of the country’s power 
they launched a number of laws, which provoked ethnic discrimination. These laws were 
formulated to benefit the Sinhalese majority and completely excluded the Tamil and other 
ethnic minorities. The seventies saw a very limited number of violent riots, however, in 
the eighties many violent riots were escalated by the Tamil resistance which were aimed 
against the Sri Lankan Sinhalese government.  
In July of 1983, these small but violent riots later became a full-blown guerrilla 
war. Most accounts describe the riots as a Sinhalese reaction to the death of 13 Sri 
Lankan soldiers, who were killed in an ambush in northern Sri Lanka by the fledgling 
LTTE. The after-effects of the riots were also devastating. The number of refugees was 
estimated at 79,000 to 80,000. This noted the beginning of the LTTE insurgency to create 
separate state for Tamils by the LTTE, and led by Velupillai Prabhakarn. The LTTE used 
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far-spreading terrorism and guerrilla war strategies against the public as well as the 
targeting of government officials throughout the eighties and the nineties. The 
government of Sri Lanka involved international communities to negotiate on a temporary 
ceasefire. However, in the spring of 2006, violent riots again erupted when the LTTE 
carried out a suicidal attack on the Army Headquarters and subsequently closed the Mavil 
aru gate in the eastern province.  
When President Rajapaksha came to power in the year 2005, he promised to 
create a rejoiced nation with no sign of the Tamil Tigers,171 a promise which echoed with 
the voices of the devastated nation. Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa, after coming into 
power in 2005, attempted to transform the features of the government and leadership 
entirely and employed guerrilla warfare strategies similar to those that were adopted by 
the Tamil Tigers in the previous three wars of Eelam. The government also attempted to 
employ the strategies which the Tamil Tigers were using through the prolonged war, 
which resulted in violent streaks, along with militant propaganda and innovative guerrilla 
warfare strategies.172 In the year 2009, the Sri Lankan government was able to militarily 
defeat LTTE terrorism and establish peace again in the country. Despite the fact that Sri 
Lanka is a developing nation, the insurgents maintained this war through resources that 
came to a large extent from external sources. In May of 2009, after a two-and-a-half year 
military offensive, the Sri Lankan security Forces surrounded the last of the insurgents.  
As proof of the insurgency's demise, a photo of LTTE leader Vellupillai 
Prabhakaran was released, with a bullet hole in his forehead. Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the 
head of the LTTE’s international diplomatic relations committee, released the following 
statement: “we have already announced to the world our position to silence our guns to 
save our people.”173 With that statement, the Tamil Tigers admitted to a military defeat 
and the longest-running war in South Asia came to an end after 25 years of gruesome 
devastation. 
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Since insurgencies continue to pose domestic and foreign policy challenges, 
counterinsurgency strategies are politically activated campaigns, which exploit all the 
elements of the country in order to eradicate the insurgent group.174 Although combating 
insurgent groups requires military resources to counteract them, certain non-military 
resources should also be used to counterbalance. These non-military strategies include re-
establishing the local authority and reforming the economy (or development of 
infrastructure).175 Although combating insurgent groups through military resources is 
more direct, certain non-military resources focus on the civilians so that the country’s 
legitimacy can be enhanced and the support for the insurgent groups can be reduced.176 
The insurgent groups and the counterinsurgency strategies combat one another to win the 
hearts and minds of the civilians. 
By 2004, the Sri Lanka intelligence network and proficiency had improved via 
internal reforms and international support. In general, the entire counterinsurgency 
strategy of the Sri Lankan government was to overwhelm the Tamil Tigers with the 
combined impact of both conventional as well as guerrilla combat strategies. Massive 
coordinated missile attacks were also launched effectively to target the Tamil Tigers. 
Such aggressive military actions deployed by the Sri Lankan government forced the 
Tamil Tigers to take defensive measures. The Sri Lankan Army commander deployed 
three task forces to the north-eastern coastline of the country. This applied added pressure 
on the Tamil Tigers.177 Later, the Sri Lankan Army deployed two more task forces to 
move from the Jaffna region to Kilinochichi to shut the northern side of the border to 
Jaffna region. Three more task forces were deployed from the southern region. During all 
this time, the Sri Lankan Army continued fighting the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan 
Navy continued fighting the Sea Tigers of the LTTE. Yet despite their successes and 
wealth, the LTTE eventually came to an end. In May of 2009, after a two-and-a-half year 
military offensive, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces surrounded the last of the insurgents. 
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During these successful operations, the Tamil Tigers were defeated because they did not 
anticipate the strength of the superior opponent and did not revise their strategies. They 
also did not anticipate the new tactics and strategies that were adopted by the military and 
armed forces of Sri Lanka. After eradicating the leadership and troops of Tamil Tigers, 
the humanitarian operation was terminated by the Sri Lankan government on 19 May 
2009. After almost 25 years, the Sri Lankan government was able to regain complete 
control of Sri Lanka.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study attempts to address lessons learned from Sri Lanka and how those 
lessons might compel us to reassess existing counterinsurgency doctrines.  
This study of Sri Lanka will not provide exact proposals on the way to conduct a 
COIN battle. It will also improve the COIN body of literature that scholars and strategists 
may study further in order to develop COIN strategies and expand the focus of COIN 
principles. Exclusively, this study is focused on understanding a government’s action 
against internal ethnic terrorism. The winning COIN strategies utilized by Sri Lanka—
which had the motto to guarantee that the domestic government is regarded as legitimate 
by the nation and also that it protects, enhances, and maintains, its right to rule—proved 
to be successful.  
Sergei De Silva Ranasinghe, in his analysis of Sri Lanka’s bloody terrorist war, 
discussed that Sri Lanka’s success was due to the “transformation of the military.” 
According to De Silva, the military development and changes commenced in late 2005 
with the selection of Mr. Mahindaa Rajapakshe as president, who assigned Gotabaya 
Rajapaksa as Secretory of the Defense. The Secretary of Defense, along with the three 
forces commanders, reformed the security forces by nominating talented and motivated 
military leaders, acquiring of new weaponries, and fervently increasing recruitment and 
practical and timely training schemas. Also, the Commander of the Army standardized 
the SIOT including Commandos and Special Forces troops, who hunted the LTTE both in 
the jungles and LTTE areas in his fight against them. Then, the Navy commander 
introduced arrowhead boat squadrons (or SBSs) to fight against suicide sea tigers, and the 
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Air Force transformation provided all kinds of combat support and close air support to 
ground forces with the available limited resources. In other words, the three services 
adopted a “clear-hold-build”178 concept on the ground, sea, and air using small elements 
instead of mass-scale troops and resources. De Silva claimed that these collective 
modifications organized the Sri Lankan forces to overrule the many challenges of 
combatting terrorism.  In this context, political and military leadership and transformation 
of government force offensive actions from conventional to a combination of 
conventional and irregular warfare tactics are salient issues to be considered in the COIN 
war.  
However, reforms implemented during the Eelam War IV by the Sri Lankan 
government need to expedite and continue to achieve the faith of the Tamil people and 
enjoy the genuine win on the insurgency. Though the LTTE terrorism may lay inactive 
for a temporary period, without focusing on the core issues of the struggle, the long-term 
panoramas for fierceness continue. While the military methodology was unpredictably 
effective in eliminating LTTE leadership and factions, the Sri Lankan Government must 
now move for a long-term political answer to soothe the country and uplift government 
legitimacy. Reconciliation with the Tamil populace must happen, commencing with 
decentralization of power. The rights of the Tamils and other minority groups, with 
guaranteed self-determination and ethnic identity, are the most suitable measures to 
sustain peace. The Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka suggests that politicization of ethnic 
distinctions by major political parties has weakened democracy and its institutions and 
thus has fueled ethnic violence and conflict, which could not be solved until Eelam War 
IV. However, good governance and a concurrent reconstruction process managed to 
significantly reduce those tensions and increase the Tamil population’s level of trust in 
the government. A continuation of the economic, political, and social development that 
has started to address the grievances of the Tamil minority during Eelam War IV is 
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essential to continue to enjoy a true and lasting victory. Hence, the concurrent 
reconstruction and rehabilitation process could be highlighted as the next major affair 
which policymakers and strategists should consider during the planning stage of a COIN 
war. 
The potential policy implications are far-reaching. A positive relationship 
between civil development and improved security would be a strong argument for 
additional aid. Indeed, this finding might suggest that resources which are currently being 
directed towards the military dimension of the counterinsurgency program might be 
better allocated in civil development. Assistance gained from the civil population during 
COIN war is of paramount importance since it provides a way to solve troop 
requirements for various COIN tasks as well as intelligence work, which was effectively 
utilized during the Sri Lanka war. Thereby, it is suggested for policymakers to work out 
COIN plans to transform the population to be used as a part of the military body when 
fighting the guerrilla war. Furthermore, this method also helps to separate insurgents 
from the population. 
The following strategies adopted by SLG and military forces could be considered 
as additional counterinsurgency strategies or principles when a nation is formulating 
COIN strategies to fight against insurgents. Even though existing COIN principles and 
strategies discuss these areas, the proper attention or focus has not been adequately given. 
Furthermore, these strategies also involve the practice of good governance and foreign 
policy. Hence, planners need to apply these into the short-term and long-term plans of a 
country in order to win the guerrilla war and maintain good governance and good 
relations with other nations: 
• Media transparency and propaganda  
• Use of technology in a coordinated intelligence network 
• External support for the government to fight the war 
• Independent government machinery and political stability  
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